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The following analysis of the concept of citizenship within the United 
Kingdom was developed and written within the context of a project on the 
‘Concepts, Limits and Foundations of European Citizenship,’ funded by 
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinscha.fi and conducted by and at the 
Zentrum fur Europaische Rechtspolitik (University of Bremen) during the 
years 1994-1998. In this regard, however, it need be noted that this study 
on UK citizenship is presented at a unique moment in British political and 
constitutional history. The 1997 election of a Labour Government 
committed to a wide-ranging reform of the representative and legal 
institutions which constitute the British State has had a profound, though 
to date incalculable affect, upon the scheme of governance and social 
organisation within the United Kingdom. Recent legislative reform has 
encompassed the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly and 
institutionalised power and sovereignty sharing with the government of 
Southern Ireland, devolution in Scotland and Wales, the establishment of a 
partially-entrenched Bill of Rights, as well as a long-term project for the 
introduction of proportional representation within the Westminster 
Parliament. On the one hand, such legislative programmes have clearly 
given a new meaning to social movements and cultural aspirations long 
dormant within the UK debate upon the concept of citizenship. Thus, for 
example, devolution movements have at last given institutional recognition 
to Scottish and Welsh claims to distinct cultural identities, while the 
Northern Ireland Agreement’s explicit of ‘multi-lateral’ (British, Irish and 
European) citizenship has likewise given formal and timely expression to 
the plurality of national identity present within Northern Ireland. On the 
other hand, however, such new arrangements are as yet indistinct both as 
to their finer details and as to the main theoretical perceptions of (national 
and post-national) governance that underpins them. In short: the reforms 
envisaged are highly novel, and only lengthy experience will tell what 
affect they will have on UK governance and its concept of citizenship.
Given both the profound nature and novelty of the reforms envisaged, 
the present author has not sought retrospectively to include them within 
this study. Indeed, in the author’s opinion, any such attempt would merely 
prove misleading—suggesting that what is now best to be regarded as a 
concept of citizenship in evolutionary flux be a culturally stable artefact. 
Instead, it is hoped that the approach taken by this study and, in particular,
Thanks are due to Matthias Konig-Archibugi, Edwige Levebre and U.K. PreuB for 




























































































its attempts to give a broad historical overview of the 
political/philosophical perceptions which have underpinned the 
constitutional relationship of the individual Briton with the British State 
(or ‘deep concept’ of UK citizenship) will provide a useful point of 
departure for those readers wishing to understand why reform is now being 
undertaken at all (especially, with regard to a Bill of Rights), as well as. 
and perhaps more importantly, why the dissolution of UK citizenship into 
a series of interconnected cultural (and even supranational) identities is 
now being achieved with an ease unimaginable in most European states.
This study has its conscious focus upon the constitutional thought which 
has informed perceptions of ‘Britishness’ and the British citizen. As an 
important consequence, it pays little direct attention to notions of 
‘otherness’ developed in areas of the UK which have historically been 
distanced from an (English) governmental and legal centre. It is 
nevertheless hoped that it sheds some light upon the recent 
institutionalisation of Welsh, Scottish and Irish identities. Indeed, the 
central theme of this study is its argument that the ‘deep concept’ of UK 
citizenship is characterised by a traditional refusal to conflate the notion of 
the Briton with that of the British State: an abiding political and 
institutional legacy which has made it easy for late 20lh Century reformers 
to at last give recognition to the claims of various groups within the British 
Isles to distinct and complex cultural/political identities.
I. Introduction: T.H. Marshall in Context
When seen in conjunction with the modern and constitutional state, the 
generally contested concept of citizenship acquires an axiomatic quality. 
An integral part of state and constitutional theory, the notion of state-based 
citizenship is predicated upon a logic all of its own. Born of French 
revolutionary action and Rousseau’s philosophical musings, modem 
citizenship supplies the essential bridge between competing notions of 
individual autonomy on the one hand, and the exercise of sovereign state 
power on the other. In both guaranteeing individual moral freedom by 
means of personal civic rights, and creating an indissoluble link between 
the individual citizen and the sovereign polity through an extensive 
(though rarely if ever universal) political franchise, the state-based notion 
of citizenship both formally constitutes the autonomous citizen and sets the 
limits to personal autonomy; establishing and legitimising the indivisible 
sovereign power of the polity, or community of citizens incorporated 




























































































Students of ‘real’ political power have long criticised this notion of 
citizenship, with ‘masters of suspicion’ from both the left and the right of 
the political spectrum considering the claim of citizenship fully to 
incorporate or include the individual citizen within the political 
community, or state, to be pure ‘rhetoric.’1 *3In this view', citizenship is in 
fact little more than a bourgeois panacea; a convenient rallying-call, mostly 
used to conceal the fact that real (political or economic) power is exercised 
by relatively few people. As is the way with axioms, however, such realist 
critiques have little or no impact upon a normative view of citizenship 
which in common with legal notions of sovereignty,; may be argued to be 
concerned less with reality and more with its own logical unity. On its own 
terms, the modem state-based concept of citizenship is thus advantaged 
above and moves beyond its classical city-based counterpart, no longer 
conceiving of the citizen merely as an adjunct of the polis; a dependent 
segment of a greater whole whose moral personality is determined by the 
political community and who has no existence outside it.’ Instead, a 
modem, or second citizenship4 5pays due regard to a ‘natural’ view of man, 
confirming individual moral autonomy through declaration or through 
entrenched rights,-' but at the same time granting political rights to 
individual citizens in order to establish the supremacy of the citizenry: a 
unitary body whose sovereign and indivisible pow'er is legitimised by its 
status as a community of autonomous and freely contracting individuals.
A philosophical and constitutional construction which allows the 
individual simultaneously to be identified as subject and citizen, bound to 
obey the sovereign and yet through voluntaristic association forming a part 
of and legitimising that same unitary power,6 state-based citizenship
1 Hindess, ‘Citizenship in the Modem West,’ in Bryan S. Turner (ed). Citizenship and 
Social Theory, (Sage: London, 1993).
: Harald Laski, ‘Law and the State,’ reproduced in, P. Hirst (ed), The Pluralist Theory 
o f the State, (Routledge: London 1993).
3 For an excellent examination of this point, Riesenberg. Citizenship in the Western 
Tradition, (Chapel Hill: London, 1992).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, and PreuB, ‘Two Challenges to Modem Citizenship,’ in (1996) Political 
Studies, Special Edition, ‘The Constitution in Transformation,’ D. Castiglione/R. 
Bellamy (eds).
6 In Rousseau’s exact words, ‘Those who are associated with it [sic. the sovereign 
power] take collectively the name of a people, and call themselves individually 
citizens, in that they share in the sovereign power, and subjects, in that they put 




























































































squares the circle between a view of man as wholly independent and fully 
able to determine his own actions, and an understanding of society as an 
association of men, tenable only if governed by one undisputed authority. 
Placing the autonomous citizen at the heart of the unitary sovereign power 
as a matter of logic, the normative view of citizenship is thus relatively 
untroubled by a realist critique which points out that the granting of the 
franchise is generally not synonymous with the receipt of real power. 
Instead, the debate on citizenship struggles with logical questions and 
inconsistencies of its own: nationhood and the question of the closure of 
community—or Rousseau vi Herder and the ethnic versus the universal 
view of the closed community of national citizens; community versus 
individualism, or the degree to which personal interests might prevail over 
those of the citizenry; and the related issue of the constitutional affirmation 
of personal autonomy and the consequent restriction in the immediate 
power of the national polity.
Moving to the world of real Nation States, these logical questions and 
the manner of their address and resolution are argued to give rise to 
differing and ‘deep’7 national concepts of state-based citizenship. The 
basic autonomy-bestowing and sovereignty-guaranteeing structures of 
citizenship remain the same, but Germany’s supposed commitment to an 
ethnic view of the state as a particularistic handmaiden of the interests of 
one pre-politically defined community, and its consequential restriction of 
the franchise to individuals sharing in a ‘German blood-line,’8 9is said 
starkly to distinguish its national view of citizenship from that of the 
French; an inclusionary perception which apparently honours its debt to 
Rousseau by rejecting exclusionary tribalism and delineating the national 
political community solely upon the basis of the individual citizen’s 
proven commitment to the universalist mores which underlie the Republic.’ 
Equally, however, French republicanism, as opposed to American 
liberalism, is also argued to leave its indelible mark upon French
7 A. Favell, ‘Philosophies of Integration: The Theory and Practice of Ethnic Minority 
Politics in France and Germany,’ PhD Thesis, (EUI: Florence, 1995), with a 
somewhat mocking reference to the results of recent investigations into French and 
German ‘nationhood,’ more specifically, W.R. Brubaker, Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany, (Harvard University Press: Harvard, 1992).
8 Though the ‘ethnic’ is generally much overstated, cf, K.H. Ladeur, ‘Towards a Legal 
Theory of Supranationality: the Viability of the Network Concept, (1997) 3:1 
European Law Journal, 3-33.
9 Recent research again demonstrating that this is very much an idealised view of 




























































































citizenship, with the citoyen varying from his unashamedly individualistic 
American counterpart by virtue of his relative lack of entrenched personal 
protection from the immediate will of the political community. Whereas 
judicial interpretation of constitutional ‘self-evident truths’ has long 
guaranteed the US citizen (though historically to varying degrees) an 
extraordinarily wide degree of personal autonomy, the limited constitutive 
nature of the revolutionary ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen and of 
Man,’ continues to determine that the natural liberty of the citoyen is 
considered best to be safeguarded by the logical assumption that a polity 
made up of autonomous contracting individuals will do nothing 
collectively which might alienate separable and constitutive individual 
freedom.10 1
Tackling the specific topic of this paper, however, it is striking that one 
supposedly ‘deep’ concept of national citizenship seems to be little 
concerned with the normative questions which have marked the debate on 
the citizen elsewhere. Long accepted as the definitive statement upon 
citizenship within the United Kingdom, T.H. Marshall’s classic analysis of 
the relationship between class formation and the evolution of citizenship 
pays little if no attention to traditional philosophical issues such as the 
identification of the national community and the balancing of individual 
and collective interest, and appears instead to go some way to answering 
realist critiques of citizenship." A milestone in citizenship theory, 
Marshall’s historical description of citizenship development within the UK 
not only relates abstract debate to concrete events, but also characterises 
citizenship as an institution which combats ‘real’ imbalances in economic 
and political might.
In this view, citizenship was not a philosophical construction but had 
simply evolved through the combined forces of 17th Century jurisprudence 
and subsequent industrial class formation: the judicial recognition of 
contractual (civic) rights (and thus post-feudal personal autonomy) not 
only having spurred the growth of a market economy, but also inevitably 
having led to the establishment of a disadvantaged but consolidated 
industrial class with a collective interest first powerful enough to ensure its 
own political emancipation, and secondly dedicated to the political pursuit 
of social rights to offset its perennial economic inequality. Less a matter of
11 Though once again recent displays of muscle by the French judiciary (more 
particularly, the Conseil d ’état) would seem to suggest that the French polity/state is 
no longer so dominant.




























































































state and constitutional theory, and more a concrete product of law and the 
market place, citizenship in the UK is thus generally considered to be a 
natural and pivotal institutional fulcrum: a mechanism which enables the 
economic interchange which sustains a market-based society; but which at 
the same time compensates for its function as a bearer of economic 
inequality by re-establishing the social parity deemed a pre-requisite for 
order and cohesion within a social setting.12 13
Leaving aside the not insignificant fact that Marshall was a sociologist 
rather than philosopher, it is tempting to ascribe the divergence of the 
apparently generally accepted UK concept of citizenship from its 
continental and US counterparts (more particularly its relative lack of 
concern about philosophical issues) to an inherently pragmatic streak in 
the ‘national character;’ a realism which equally permeates the UK 
approach to governmental and social structures. On this reading, the 
seemingly very concrete institution of industrial citizenship with its 
emphasis upon the distribution of real power rather than logical perfection, 
should simply be accepted as the ‘deep’ concept of citizenship most 
appropriate to the UK setting. Such prosaic pragmatism apart, however, it 
will nonetheless be argued here that to do so would not only entail too 
ready an acceptance of the accuracy of Marshall’s analysis, but would also 
detract attention from the most prescient challenge posed a largely 
uninvestigated philosophical formulation of the normative status of the UK 
citizen (or more accurately phrased, the constitutional conception of the 
relationship between the individual and the state) to traditional concepts of 
state-based citizenship: its apparent deviance from the axiomatic bedrock 
assumption that citizenship is an institution which at once formally 
constitutes and limits personal autonomy, legally establishing both 
individual freedom and indivisible collective sovereignty, and inevitably 
linking the status and fate of the individual citizen to that of the (national) 
polity or (Nation) state.
Explaining this point further, however, whereas the notion of industrial 
citizenship has recently drawn widespread criticism, the debate on the UK 
citizen has equally begun to lay new emphasis upon the evolutionary 
significance of philosophical considerations and normative institutions. 
Predictably, Marshall’s failure even to investigate the notion of ‘national’ 
community has been highlighted.'5 Far more damagingly, however, 
political philosophers have also pointed to his incongruent emphasis upon
12 Ibid.




























































































the importance of ‘rights’ in relation to a national society infamous for its 
rejection of such positive legal expressions, and his concomitant disregard 
for the ‘deep’ philosophical foundations of UK society.14 Likewise, recent 
sociological research has further demonstrated that historical patterns of 
political participation in the UK do not coincide either spatially or 
temporally with those of industrialisation, and has instead laid new weight 
upon the contribution of normative institutions, such as the rule of law, to 
the development of political citizenship.15 Adding to such critiques, 
however, it might also be suggested here that Marshall’s analysis is limited 
and best understood if seen in the light of the politics and social goals of 
its era: its core assumption that the use of common national political 
institutions for the pursuit of what were at heart particularistic (working) 
class interests would nonetheless serve overall social cohesion (and thus 
the interests of the entire nation), providing timely normative justification 
for the unashamedly collectivist post-war construction of the British 
Welfare State. Founded not upon a neutral and generally accepted concept 
of social justice, but built instead upon a pragmatic vision of ‘inevitable’ 
social balance, the notion of industrial citizenship thus nevertheless laid 
the basis for a new and axiomatic understanding of citizenship rights suited 
to the politics of its age: the essentially utilitarian goal of social cohesion 
allowing for the ready translation of a class-based and particularistic 
demand for social redress into a universal and famously inclusive concept 
of the citizen as a bearer of social as well as political and civic rights.16
As such, Marshall’s analysis becomes of interest to this study not 
because it is the definitive statement upon the ‘deep’ structures of UK 
citizenship, but since it may be argued to be a litmus not only of the 
underlying philosophies which have helped to shape relations between 
Britons and their state, but also of certain of the institutional (or 
constitutional) facets of UK citizenship: being primarily reflective of the 
vital role played by a desire for social order in the history of UK 
citizenship evolution, but also hinting (through its acceptance of a 
somewhat partisan post-war approach to the national institution of political
14 A. Favell, op cit, n 7.
15 Sommers, ‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law Community, and 
Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy,’ (1993) 58:5 American Sociological 
Review.
16 Not least Marshall himself, cf, T.H. Marshall, Social Policy (Hutchison: London, 
1975); but perhaps now best represented by the modernised and highly normativised 
view of Marshall’s theory as expounded by Ralph Dahrendorf, cf, Der modeme 




























































































citizenship) that the interests of the sovereign British State, or polity, are 
neither logically nor immediately commensurate with those of the national 
community or individual citizen. By placing Marshall in his own historical 
context and instead seeking the essence of UK citizenship through a wider 
historical survey of the nature and contextual origin of the philosophical 
impulses which have influenced a normative constitutional conception of 
the relationship between the individual Briton and the national community 
(and/or British State), the following study is thus not merely concerned 
with ancillary issues such as nationhood and individualism v.v community. 
Instead, with surprising and currently very' relevant results it also 
investigates the more fundamental question of how notions of citizenship 
within the UK have sought to fulfil their supposedly axiomatic function of 
reconciling the ‘natural’ autonomy of man with a perceived societal need 
for one sovereign power.
Recapping briefly, in order to provide for the philosophical fusion of 
competing Lockean notions of natural individual freedom with 
Bodinian/Hobbesian concepts of sovereign power, state-based citizenship 
inextricable links the fate of the individual citizen with that of the 
constituted state. The constituted state, with its positive formulation of 
individual rights and politically incorporated citizenry, is thus considered 
to be the natural ally and expression of personal freedom and social order. 
Itself no more than a voluntaristic community of citizens, the body politic 
or state, is not only able through positive law to give concrete shape to 
otherwise vague natural notions of personal autonomy, but might also 
deploy its collectively legitimised and undisputed sovereignty to ensure 
social order through the limitation of individual action. Accordingly, and 
for good logical reasons, the axiom of state-based citizenship would be 
unable ever to conceive of the individual citizen ‘outside’ of or 
independently from the state. Without doubt, and in contrast to the 
classical world, the modem citizen’s moral existence is not wholly 
dependent upon the polity or constituted state; civic rights not ‘creating’ 
personal autonomy as such, but merely formalising a pre-existing and pre- 
statal ‘natural’ liberty.17 However, by virtue of its positivisation of civic 
rights and its claim to collective political sovereignty over the social (the
17 However, brief analogy to the Locke/Rousseau conflict on the ‘existence’ or ‘non- 
existence’ of property is irresistible: Rousseau arguing that property had no existence 
prior to the establishment of the law of contract and Locke famously supporting a 
natural view pre-iegal view of property as the outcome of ‘just bodily labour,’ cf, for 





























































































two functions together being no more than an expression of its monopoly 
power to ‘define’ the public/private divide), the constituted state is 
nonetheless integral to the whole of the individual citizen’s status, carving 
out the private realm in which moral autonomy might be exercised and 
conversely establishing the breadth of the social sphere in which collective 
political limits might be placed on individual freedom.
In the United Kingdom, however, it is exactly this form of mutually- 
enforcing relationship between citizen and state whose presence might be 
doubted: neither is the Briton politically incorporated within the state, nor 
is the Briton’s individual autonomy formally confirmed by the state 
through positive and constitutive rights; a unique construction which will 
be argued to be of particular relevance to a current ‘European’ debate on 
citizenship. To be sure, as much of the following analysis demonstrates, a 
great deal of the distance between individual Briton and British State 
derives from a complex, and at times simply arcane constitutionalism 
which, struggling to hold modem normative concepts of voluntaristic and 
constituted statehood at bay, clings instead to a fanciful—on occasions 
even stomach-churning—vision of the British State and ‘nation’ as a 
cohesive monarchical realm. On the other hand, however, as a careful and 
contextual examination of the evolution of UK constitutional thought 
shows, the incongruent status of the individual Briton (an incongruence 
best highlighted by the on-going debate on whether the Briton in fact be 
subject or citizen) also derives from far more serious realist perceptions, 
normative considerations and institutional preoccupations; concerns and 
structures which may and will be argued to have vital relevance to post- 
statal and post-national attempts to conceive of citizenship outside of or 
across the borders of the (Nation) state.
Accordingly, this study is broken down into two section. The first, 
analyses the reception within UK constitutional thought of notions of 
individual moral autonomy and (political) sovereignty, and their affect 
upon constitutional descriptions of the relationship to be established 
between the Briton and the British State and/or polity. The assumption 
being that it is this constitutional perception which captures the true ‘deep’ 
essence of UK citizenship, two vitally important leitmotifs begin to 
emerge. First, the Briton is best conceived of as retaining his/her somewhat 
indistinct ‘natural’ status, being fully autonomous from the British State: 
not only for the normative reason that UK (or at least, English) 




























































































restrictive constitutionalised form18) as the enemy and not the natural 
guardian of individual autonomy; but also upon the vital institutional 
grounds that the 'common law’ provides an alternative (non-statal/non- 
political) means to regulate individual relations within a private sphere 
which both pre-dates and exists ‘outside’ the polity or state. Secondly, 
however, the Briton is similarly distanced from the state, being represented 
rather than incorporated within its polity; this anti-voluntaristic view of the 
British State, being based upon the sovereignty of its political institutions 
rather than citizenry, and sustained by an institutional conservatism which 
conceives of ‘political Britons,’ in explicitly hierarchical (and historically 
paternalistic) rather than unitary terms.
The hallmark, at least of the constitutional perception of the British 
citizen being argued to be ‘autonomy and representation,’ a second section 
then attempts briefly to demonstrate that this unusual ‘deep’ national 
concept of citizenship is not merely an interesting historical aberration or 
normative fantasy with no relevance to real events in a modem world. 
More particularly, with an eye to the problems of governance and 
citizenship in a post-statal world, the paper argues that the ‘deep’ concept 
of UK citizenship contains lessons—both positive and negative—relevant 
to the evolution of ‘European citizenship.’
First, it may be argued that is an obvious blueprint for a necessarily non- 
statal form of citizenship; a private citizenship which may be governed and 
regulated by ‘common’ or ‘stateless law.’ Secondly, however, (and here 
the analysis not only strays slightly from the strict constitutionalist path but 
also grows more speculative) it equally contains serious flaws. More 
particularly, in the absence of an incorporated polity and/or positively 
expressed rights, the UK is notable both for its lack of a formally- 
expressed (aggregative) collective interest and for the absence of a neutral 
(non-political) mechanism for the balancing of collective against 
individual interest. Accordingly, in a post-war period, the establishment of 
collective interest and its limitation appears to be an earthy matter of daily 
and combatative (party) politics, or the particularist conquering of common 
political institutions: alternatively, returning to Marshall, the establishment 
of universal social/industrial citizenship followed upon the ‘seizure’ of the 
sovereign power (Parliament) by a post-war Labour Party with a 
programme (parochial in its inception) of social (class-based) renewal. 
Considered in its time to be representative of a British ‘constitutional





























































































moment,’ social/industrial citizenship (universal in its application) was 
nonetheless quickly to begin to wither as opposing Thatcherite forces of 
atavistic individualism were to scale the political heights: its claim to be a 
collective goal, and its precedence over individual economic interests, 
lasting only as long as the political predominance of its proponents and 
their ability to impose it upon society at large.
The message for Europe? That we should institutionalise our ‘collective 
European interest,’ turning to notions of incorporation and the formally 
constituted unitary will? No: the lesson is far more one of how illusionary 
itself is the concept of aggregative collectivism. Drawing explicitly upon 
the English pluralists* 20 and likewise attempting to shed some light on very 
recent UK constitutional developments:21 if national societies are 
‘federations’22 of divergent, self-defining and competing private and joint 
interests , how much more so is a European society. Further, neither states, 
putative super-states, nor common political institutions can hope ever to 
embody, establish or sustain a ‘substantive’ aggregate interest, and would 
be better placed seeking a ‘procedural common good,’ mediating between 
the interests of plural, self defining and private individual citizens and 
groups of citizens.
II. The Ancien Regime: Rousseau Rejected
As noted, ‘deep’ philosophical rather than ‘realist’ perceptions of 
citizenship have much to do with the normative battle to balance 
competing notions of individual and empowering autonomy with collective 
(political) sovereignty. This, however, is a dilemma most commonly 
tackled within the confines of constitution-making; and the 
constitutionalist process whereby the state is created, the status of the 
individual is legally defined and the relationship of the individual with the 
state is established, furnishes the forum in which philosophical attempts to 
reconcile autonomy and collective sovereignty may be formally translated 
into and enshrined in law. Accordingly, the ideas and concepts which were 
to influence a deep and peculiarly British notion of citizenship were to be 
woven into UK (or, perhaps better phrased, English) constitutional
iQ To use Ackerman’s terms.
20 Bitterly opposed (at least prior to the 1945 landslide election) to Attlee’s collectivist 
Labour Party, cf, Hirst in idem (ed), The Pluralist Theory o f the State, op cit, n 2.
21 More particularly the 'national’ devolution movement and curious incomplete 
attempts to entrench civic rights, supra, at III C.




























































































thinking and law during a protracted period of constitutional evolution: 
beginning prior to the 1600s and reaching maturity only with the 
establishment of modem institutions and mores of governance during the 
first half of this Century.
A detailed investigation of this historical period of philosophical and 
institutional development—or the Ancien regime upon which post-war. 
and politically realistic, concepts of industrial citizenship were to be 
grafted—nonetheless quickly reveals the extraordinary degree to which 
UK perceptions of citizenship were to diverge from dominant continental 
and American models: a divergence perhaps most immediately
demonstrated by Edwardian academic uncertainty as to whether the Briton 
was best to be considered a ‘citizen' or a ‘subject.’
A. The Citizen Doubted
Though no stranger to the British political stage, the notion of the 
citizen is wholly new to English common law. At the turn of this Century, 
this curious circumstance gave rise to furious debate between (what we 
would today term) political analysts and lawyers.2' The object of the 
controversy: the exact status of the individual Briton. In the minds of 
politicians, schooled in the distribution of real power, it seemed no more 
than a matter of common sense to conceive of enfranchised and 
empowered Britons as ‘British Citizens.’23 4 To lawyers, on the contrary, a 
national British citizenship was at best a nonsensical concept, at worst a 
‘rhetorical’ phrase into which a wide variety of meanings might be read.25 
As a consequence, the legal community disdained the term citizen and 
remained true to its own doctrine of monarchical allegiance and 
subjecthood: whilst one lawyer was to comment that citizenship have no 
legal meaning beyond the identification of the ‘burghers of a municipal 
corporation’ enjoying ‘the purely honorary rank of a city,’26 yet another 
was to confirm that the ‘language and law of England’ knew ‘of subjects 
only.’27
23 Exemplary, British Citizenship: A Discussion Initiated by E.B. Sargant, reprinted 
from the Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute (United Empire), (Longmans, Green 
& Co: London, 1912).
24 E. B. Sargant, in, British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 42-59.
25 J. Westlake (Professor, K.C., L.L.D.), in, British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 9-11.
26 Ibid.
27 Though regretfully, J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part I), [1901] 17 





























































































Initially, at least, it may argued that the root cause of the conflict lay in 
the differing meanings which each discipline (political and legal) ascribed 
to the concept of national citizenship. Political commentators appeared to 
take a minimalist view of the citizen, simply equating the term with ‘a right 
of voting.’28 Thus, a specifically ‘national’ citizenship was argued logically 
to have evolved in simple step with the development of an effective 
national political assembly and the progressive widening of the franchise 
into a nation-wide institution.29 30 In this pragmatic view, the heart of 
citizenship lay in the act of ‘free political association,’ and ‘so long as 
there was a deliberative assembly which in some fashion represented the 
nation as a whole,”0 it clearly made sense to envision of the British as a 
nation of political citizens associating freely via their representatives in the 
House of Commons.
Lawyers on the other hand, were guided by a more comprehensive and 
normative understanding of the concept of national citizenship. Seemingly 
directly influenced by purist classical notions of the citizen,31 legal 
commentators insisted upon breaking down national citizenship into two 
constitutive elements: first, arguing that it needs must encompass a 
tangible and exclusionary notion of nationhood or national belonging; and 
secondly, claiming that it need also positively formalise or ‘incorporate’ 
the national process of political association, so creating additional 
‘horizontal’ bonds of belonging between individual citizens. When 
measured against these more rigorous of normative yardsticks, the status of 
the individual Briton, increasingly inclusive suffrage notwithstanding, 
seemed to differ radically from that of national citizen.
To begin the notions of nationhood or national belonging. In 1900 as 
today, the United Kingdom eschewed any ‘deep’ concepts of the Nation.32 
A pre-political conception of nationhood—or in then current terms, the 
idea that:
28 ‘Editorial Comment,' in. British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 9.
29 E. B. Sargant, in, British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 42-59.
30 Ibid.
31 Most notably and probably attributable to a training in Roman law, J.W. Salmond, 
‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part I), loc cit, n 27, and J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship 
and Allegiance’ (Part II), [1902] 17 Law Quarterly Review, 49-63.
32 A. Favell, ‘Philosophies of Integration: The Theory and Practice of Ethnic Minority 




























































































‘[A] Nation is a society of men united by common blood and descent, and by the 
various subsidiary bonds incidental thereto, such as common speech, religion, and 
manners’33
in any case seemed singularly inappropriate within a political union 
made up of various Celtic and Anglo-Saxon ethnic groupings. Equally, 
however, more philosophical bases for national belonging comparable with 
Rousseau’s ‘civic religion’ of the Nation, had similarly passed Britain by.'4 
Instead, the ‘nationality’ element within British law was still supplied by 
the feudal, and decidedly ‘nation-neutral’ common law doctrine of 
monarchical allegiance which labelled as British Subjects all those who 
perchance were bom within the King’s dominions. Paying no attention to 
the race, religion, creed or philosophical attitudes of those from whom 
allegiance to the Crown was demanded, the doctrine’s unqualified rule of 
ius soli established an inclusionary view of Britishness which seemed to 
derive solely from the physical accident of residence within British 
territories. As one lawyer was to argue, this gave rise to a purely ’territorial 
union’ rather than higher ‘personal union’ between Britons and the British 
State,35 so mitigating both against the notion of national belonging and 
against that of a ’nationally-flavoured’ citizenship.
Secondly, however, there was also the small matter of the non­
incorporation of the British body politic. In legal minds, the essence of 
citizenship lay in the Roman conception of the state ‘as an association of 
fellow-members, incorporated into one body politic or respublica,’36 37The 
strength of this incorporated community had derived from the fact that 
‘Roman citizens were men bound to one another by the personal bond of 
fellow-membership of one body.’3’ Horizontal ties were therefore 
established between the members of the citizenry: ties upon which mutual 
duties, rights and obligations might be built. Within the United Kingdom, 
however, a ‘feudal’ monarchy had displaced corporatist notions of the Res 
publica, severed horizontal bonds, and instead imposed hierarchical ties of 
loyalty and allegiance between the individual Briton and the sovereign. 
The notion of the state as an incorporated community was thus to be 
forever unknown to English law with the notable consequence that there be 
no body or Res publica of which Britons might be members.
33 J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part I), loc cit, n 27, at 272.
34 D. Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History and Politics, (Longmann: 
London, 1990)
35 J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part I), loc cit, n 27.





























































































Once again, the common law doctrine of allegiance had ensured that 
British Subjects were ‘men bound, not to one another, but to a common 
superior.’ The law recognised the Crown as a corporation, but Britons, the 
‘aggregate of the subjects of the Crown, [had] no legal identity or 
personality.’ In law at least, there was no populus Britannicus analogous 
with the populus Romanus of antiquity.’8 Thinking rigidly (as lawyers are 
wont to do), this absence of any formal ties between individual Britons 
then surely precluded that most fundamental of elements within 
citizenship: the idea that it constitute a tangible community of common 
interest, or a notion of fellow-membership upon which mutual duties, 
rights and obligations might be built.
2. Constitutional Conflict: Legal Subjects vs Political Citizens
Vitally, however, the discord between lawyers and political analysts was 
not merely a product of the differing views which each group held of the 
‘true’ nature of national citizenship. Instead, or so it may be argued, such 
conflict ultimately derived from two very varied readings of the exact 
nature of the British Constitution, and of the position of the individual 
Briton in relation to that Constitution. In explanation: the abiding refusal 
to commit the UK’s Constitution to paper, and/or to transform its scheme 
of unwritten mores, rules and practices into a coherent, visible and positive 
body of norms, is often argued to have contributed to the historical 
stability of the British State. Alternatively, the Constitution’s genius is said 
to lie in its inherent flexibility. Radical alterations in the social and 
political make-up of the United Kingdom might so be simply 
accommodated within the structures of this living body of law, dispensing 
with the need for those more disruptive of revolutionary transformations so 
often witnessed on the continent.
Advantageous as this chameleon-like character may be, however, it may 
nonetheless also present certain difficulties of its own. In particular, the 
elasticity of the UK Constitution and its heavy reliance upon ‘formulaic 
reverence’ dictates that there have been correspondingly few clear breaks 
with the past.’” Consequently, whilst new political and philosophical ideas 
may have found their way into this unwritten document, the lack of 
momentous founding moments, or comprehensive overhauls of the 
Constitution, has inevitably led to a considerable amount of conceptual 38*
38 Ibid.





























































































overlapping with newer ideas often being called upon to co-exist with the 
old. In the common sense words of Thomas Paine, this determines that the 
Constitution be ‘exceedingly complex.’ In the real world of constitutional 
politics, however, it also dictates that there invariably be a degree of 
tension between often inconsistent and sometimes competing 
constitutional principles. When seen in this light, the turn of the Century 
dispute between lawyers and political commentators accordingly takes on 
an added hue becoming less of a matter of definitional divergence, and 
more a case of constitutional conflict between the supporters of the ancient 
constitutional principle of monarchical subjecthood and the champions of a 
newer ideal of political citizenship. In short: the legal subject vs the 
political citizen.
2.1. The Superior Status of the Legal Subject?
In explanation: at the heart of such constitutional conflict, lay a 
fundamental and double-sided disagreement; first, as to where the 
‘allegiance of the individual Briton might be said to lie; and secondly, as to 
the particular consequences of such allegiance. In legal analysis, allegiance 
or ‘ligeance’ was a principle dating from the early medieval ages which 
had been given a firm constitutional footing by the celebrated Calvin's 
Case of 1608.40 It was a hierarchical tie which created the status of British 
subject and concurrently established mutual and indissoluble bonds of 
service and loyalty between the individual subject and the British Crown.41 42
Further, however, allegiance-based subjecthood was an organic status 
entailing substantive rights and duties which were naturally superior to 
democratically determined rights or duties of political citizenship. Vitally, 
this latter idea was to be firmly ensconced in case-law, being most 
powerfully enunciated in the somewhat surprising Judgement of Murray v 
Parkes.'1
A decision that Mr Parkes, a citizen of the Irish (Free) State, be a British 
Subject by simple virtue of his birth within the King’s dominions and 
hence liable for British military service, was thus notably accompanied by
40 (1608) 7 Co. Rep.
41 Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co. Rep., establishing a distinctly personal tie of allegiance 
between the Briton and the individual Monarch, with on-going allegiance secured by 
the maxim ‘the King never dies,’ Isaacson v Durant (Stepney Election Petition) 
(1886) 17 Q.B.D. 54, rationalising this relationship somewhat, establishing 





























































































the illuminating phrase that Mr Parkes’ British subjecthood be ‘the 
superior political status,’ his Irish citizenship, a mere ‘municipal standing’ 
to which various minor rights and obligations attached.4’ The Judgement, 
however, was no more than an inevitable consequence of the feudal 
doctrine that a natural bom subject of the King might never sever his bond 
of fealty or renounce his allegiance to the British Crown: nemo potest 
exuere patriam. Though the doctrine admitted of the possibility that a 
subject might have two lords, only one—the British King—was a ‘liege’ 
lord who might by virtue of this elevated position claim the superior bond 
of allegiance: unus et idem duo rum dominorum homo ligius esse non 
potest.“ Therefore, while Mr Parkes as an Irish citizen owed a degree of 
fealty to the newly constituted Irish Republic, such loyalty could not of 
itself43 5 sever his allegiance to the British Crown. Equally, this tie of 
allegiance was necessarily stronger than that owed to the Irish Republic.
Whilst undoubtedly a relic of the medieval age, the longevity of the 
doctrine of monarchical allegiance nonetheless appeared to have the very 
modem effect of dictating that although British subjects might engage in 
free political association—and even create a democratic state with 
‘sovereign’ claims over its own citizens—the British Crown might 
nonetheless make a prior and enduring claim to the individual citizen- 
subject’s loyalty: personal organic allegiance appearing to override all 
democratically determined rights and duties.
2.2. The Predominance of the Political Citizen?
To political analysts, however, allegiance was no longer a matter of a 
bond of personal loyalty between the individual Briton and the Crown. 
Rather, in this view, the doctrine had not escaped the effects of a 
fundamental shift in the British Constitution which had seen real political 
power move away from the person of the monarch to the body of the 
House of Commons. As electors, Britons shared in such power, and
43 Viscount Caldecote C.J.. at 130, confirming Lord Westbury, Udny v Udny (1896) L. 
R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441,457.
44 J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part II), loc cit, n 31, at 51, confirming 
Forsyth’s Cases and Opinions in Constitutional Law.
45 Allegiance might nonetheless be severed if two conditions be satisfied. First, the 
Crown consent to a severance. Secondly, the former subject take some action that 
show that he no longer consider himself bound by the tie of allegiance, cf, Udny v 





























































































accordingly their allegiance now centred upon Parliament.46 With this shift 
in loyalty, the rights and duties of the political citizen were now deemed to 
take precedence over those of the legal subject.
Admittedly, however, the process whereby the political citizen had 
gained predominance over the legal subject, had been a lengthy one.47 In 
explanation: the modem citizen was said directly to derive from the 
citizens and burgesses of the medieval Cities and Boroughs which through 
grant of Royal Charter had regained a measure of the self-governance and 
autonomy they had anciently enjoyed within the Roman Empire." 
Although such egalitarian centres of political association were to be all but 
obliterated under a Saxon hegemony which preferred to emphasise its own 
brand of particularistic tribal allegiance; the severed link to the classical 
notion of egalitarian and democratic city-based citizenship was 
nevertheless to be re-established in the early middle ages by virtue of 
Norman invasion and the growing influence of the consolidated medieval 
Church. Both Law French4" and Canon Law,40 were thus to play their part in 
re-introducing classical notions of incorporated cities and the citizen into 
England.5' As a consequence, life was breathed into the few remaining 
centres of city-based citizenship,57 and, albeit in shadow form, the citizen 
of antiquity was to live on throughout English history. Though forever 
vulnerable to monarchical efforts to manipulate and repress Charters, 
autonomous cities and boroughs nonetheless provided a prototype arena
46 E. B. Sargant, in, British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 42-59.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
46 Noting the general influence of Norman French ideas on English legal thought, R. 
Zimmermann, ‘Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law',’ in
xxxx.
50 The Church’s pivotal role in the re-introduction of classical citizenship into England 
being best demonstrated by the canon law dictate that a city with a Cathedral might 
demand of right a Royal Charter giving it a degree of automatic independence from 
Royal administration.
51 The rediscovered Corpus luris Civilis which is generally attributed with re­
introducing classical concepts of citizenship into medieval Europe, cf, P. Riesenberg, 
Citizenship in the Western Tradition, op cit, n 3, arguably finding its way into 
England via the civilian legal systems of law french and canon law, rather than the 
heavily Saxon influenced common law.
52 Most notably London which managed to maintain a semi-autonomous form of self- 
government throughout Saxon and Norman occupation regaining its official status as 
a corporation by Royal Charter in 1215, cf, F. Barker/P. Jackson, London: 2000 




























































































for democratic participation. The election of Mayors, Alderman and Guild 
officers thus furnished the freemen or citizens of these enclaves with the 
opportunity directly to influence the laws under which they were to live, 
and so to develop an effective form of municipal citizenship.
Importantly, as Norman and then English Kings consolidated their rule, 
and were able to enforce a feudal notion of monarchical subjecthood 
throughout the Realm, the citizens and burgesses of the cities and 
boroughs were to develop a dual status as citizens and subjects. When 
acting within the terms of the Royal Charters, their status as citizen or 
burgess was uppermost: the rights and duties of the citizen—autonomously 
determined within the cities—taking precedence over the rights and duties 
of the subject. Without the limits of Royal concessions, however, citizens 
came under the direct control of the King’s law and their rights and duties 
were accordingly those of the monarchical subject.”
With the appointment of representatives from the cities and Boroughs to 
the first Long Parliament, however, the autonomous sphere of citizen’s 
rights and duties encroached into the national arena and began to compete 
directly with that of the subject. Though at first such representatives had a 
very limited role, merely consulting with the King, their alliance with the 
representative Knights of the Shire to form the Commons was argued to 
have proven to be decisive; on the one hand, contributing to the re- 
introduction of popular control over civic administration within the 
shires;'4 and on the other, establishing a popular and national assembly 
with sufficient power to influence the King in his law-making. Through 
their representatives, citizens and burgesses throughout the country now 
possessed a degree of national political power, or a limited national 
citizenship to complement their more comprehensive municipal 
citizenship. This power might so further be exercised as to diminish 
obligations of personal allegiance to the King. Whilst the Crown retained 
its wide-ranging prerogatives, the obligations of personal allegiance might 
never be wholly precluded. Equally, however, the existence of a popular 
national assembly similarly ensured that such feudal obligations might 534
53 Alternatively medieval citizenship was a matter of the ‘purchase of a sphere, secured 
from the King, in which to conduct private relations with other citizens,’ British 
Citizenship, op cit, n 23.
54 E. B. Sargant, in, British Citizenship, loc cit, n 23, 50. For the vital significance of 
this re-introduction of country-wide popular and decentralised administration upon 
the general development of citizenship participation in the UK, cf, M. Sommers, 
‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law Community, and Political 




























































































never wholly override those of a national self-determining citizenship. In 
short: a form of equilibrium was established between two powers, the 
Crown and Parliament, a balance which was mirrored by the evolution of a 
dual national status for the Briton. On the one hand, he was a legal subject 
under the direct influence of the Crown, or the King's law together with 
the rights and duties which it entailed. On the other, a national political 
citizen, playing his own part in the development of a series of 
deliberatively determined rights and duties.
Moving on through history, however, the balance of political power was 
slowly to tilt in the Commons and the citizen’s favour. In particular, the 
civil war, interregnum, restoration, glorious revolution and the 1701 Acts 
of Settlement, were drastically to reduce the monarchical prerogative, and 
to relocate it in the hands of a parliamentary executive. Political power 
thus shifted towards the Commons. Over the following Centuries, classic 
restatements of the Constitution by Blackstone, Bagehot and Dicey, 
contributed to the continuous empowerment of this body. At the same 
time, the gradual widening of the franchise and the evolution of effective 
party machines similarly ensured than an ever larger number of Britons be 
represented by its members, and that the UK as whole move towards mass 
democratic participation. With the hard-fought for Reform Acts of 1832 
and 1867, the last vestiges of privileged efforts to manipulate local and 
national political processes were finally swept aside. The Rotten Boroughs 
were no more and the political map of Britain was now characterised by a 
dual system of fair, effective and participatory local administration, and 
empowered and democratically representative national government. Most 
male Britons were now municipal and national citizens, playing their part 
both in local civic administration and in the election of representatives to 
the Commons, the most powerful political body in the Realm. In short: 
democratically determined law had prevailed above monarchical dictate. 
Accordingly, ‘the national rights and duties of the citizen ultimately took 
precedence of the rights and duties of the subject,’ and consequently, ‘an 
actual transfer of allegiance’ was argued finally to have been secured.”
3. The Issues Restated
At one level, it is possible to rationalise this turn of the century debate 
on the status of the individual Briton, boiling it down to a fundamental 
disagreement between lawyers and political scientists about the 
distribution and status of formerly monarchical prerogatives. Clearly, both




























































































Parliament and the Courts exercised such prerogatives. The political 
community’s assertion that the Briton be a citizen rather than a subject, 
however, derived from the fact the prerogatives of the common law—and 
thus the status of British subject—were merely residual, and might be 
exercised only to the extent that that Parliament—and the British citizen— 
tolerated their use. Alternatively, the Briton now enjoyed an autonomous 
sphere so large that he might, if he so wished, simply set his status as 
British subject aside.
Such theoretical considerations aside, the fact nonetheless remains that 
the Political Community continued to tolerate the operations of the 
common law outside the sphere of democratically determined statute law, 
and in particular, took no action to set aside the doctrine of allegiance and 
the notion of British subjecthood. The Briton was both citizen and subject. 
In short, a complex, contradictory and inconclusive situation which 
nonetheless proves illuminating for this purposes of this study: first, 
clearly highlighting the difficulties which any attempt to capture the 
‘essence’ of UK citizenship may face; but secondly, also providing a 
pointer to the major issues which have characterised British debate upon 
the position of the Briton.
3.1. Subjects and Citizens: A Dual Status
To begin first, however, with the difficulties. Primary amongst these, is 
the fact that within the UK setting, the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ appear 
to diverge from their more commonly accepted meanings. The classical 
and oft-reiterated dictum that the word subject simply connote a status of 
subjection to a single sovereign power, whilst the status of citizen entail a 
share in that same power,51’ is seemingly far too simple a construct to 
capture the nuances of the British case. Whilst Frenchmen in 1900 were 
simultaneously subjects and citizens of the French state, Edwardian 
Britons were subjects of the British Crown, but citizens of the British 
Parliament: the two distinct statuses relating to different constitutional 
organs. Each was thus educed from its own legitimising source, was a 
substantive status and carried its own peculiar set of rights and duties.
The legal subject was a creature of the ‘common law.’ As such, it 
derived neither from democratic process nor from the higher principles of a 
constitution, but from a monarchical authority deemed to exist prior to and 
independently from the modem institutions of the British State. Neither




























































































was common law a law legitimated through conventional democratic 
process; nor was it normatively derived from a popular constitutive act. 
Instead, in a historical development which was to infuriate generations of 
British philosophical thinkers in turn,57 common law Judges had 
perpetuated and promulgated the ancient principles of an equally 
antiquated legal system into a modem and democratic age. Whilst by 1900 
a considerable proportion of law-making in the UK was effected by statute 
and might so be directly traceable to the democratic will of the British 
people, large areas of law nevertheless remained within the purview of the 
Judges and were thus impervious to this form of popular pressure. 
Accordingly, subjecthood appeared to be a status over which individual 
Britons had little conventional political control.
Equally, however, the status of subject was a significant one. First, 
subjecthood supplied the missing nationality element within the British 
Constitution. Through the doctrine of allegiance it determined who might 
be considered to ‘belong’ to the British State. Secondly, it established a 
series of positive duties which were owed by Britons to the British State.58 
Finally, however, it also contained one vitally significant right—that of the 
right to the protection of the King’s or common law.59 In other words, or so 
it will be argued below, subjecthood was the vital gateway to the 
enjoyment of the not-inconsiderable civic rights and notions of procedural 
justice which the common law—however undemocratically—had 
established within its own jurisdiction.
Citizenship on the contrary, was a political rather than legal status, and 
was accordingly intimately entwined with the national democratic process. 
Simply stated, national citizens shared in the exercise of the legislative 
powers of parliament. Their existence legitimised by the national 
democratic process, citizens possessed one major right, that of 
participation in national political processes. Unlike French citizens, British 
citizens were not formally recognised by higher law and the extent of 
citizenship was consequently determined by simple legislative fiat rather 
than constitutional principle. This lack of constitutional incorporation, 
however, did not detract from the fact that citizen-electors, unlike subjects,
57 The champion of the utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham dismissing the common law as 
‘sham law,’ ‘a thing merely imaginary' and as ‘power everywhere arbitrary,’ cf., A 
Comment on the Commentaries, (Scentia: Aelen, 1976).
58 The most far-reaching of these being the duty to desist from treasonable behaviour.





























































































were ‘autonomous’ actors who through a process of political association 
enjoyed a measure of self-determination." In common with the citizens of 
the medieval cities and boroughs, modem national citizens thus enjoyed an 
autonomous sphere of political action, free from the influence of the 
Crown (or the common law), in which they might themselves determine 
the character of the relations maintained between individual Britons.
At one simple level, the dual status of citizen and subject creates certain 
analytical difficulties. Is the earnest investigator of UK citizenship to 
simply ignore such distinctions, counting the rights which attached to the 
ancient status of subject as more modem rights of citizenship? At yet 
another, however, the sometimes discordant relationship between 
citizenship and subjecthood,60 1 provides a first indication of one of the 
major issues to characterise the citizenship debate in the UK, its subtle 
variation upon the much discussed theme of the self-determining political 
community vs individual rights.
3.2. The Self-Determining Political Community vs Individual
Rights
Between ancient and modem forms of citizenship—or between the 
‘first’ and ‘second’ citizenship62—there lie two thousand years and an 
apparent contradiction. Classical citizenship was predicated wholly upon 
the republic. Citizenship grew out of and was expressed through the act of 
political association. Beyond such communal political expression, 
however, the individual citizen had no particular identity. The polis and 
not the individual citizen lay at the centre of the classical universal. As a 
consequence, the polis' political power was unlimited. The self- 
determining political community was just that: a community which might 
rule on all aspects of communal or individual life.
Modem citizenship, on the contrary, was rooted in the constitutional 
recognition of the identity and humanity of the individual citizen.63 Dating 
from the revolutionary French ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen and
60 D. Heater/D. Oliver, The Foundations of Citizenship, (Harvester Wheatsheaf: 
London 1994).
61 Cf., Murray v Parkes, loc cit, n 42.
63 P. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition, op cit, n 3.




























































































of Man,’64 the second citizenship was consequently an unashamedly 
individualistic notion. The recognition in higher law that the individual be 
a free bom being bequeathed with equal civic rights, had been 
commensurate with a statement that individuals be sufficiently worthy to 
determine their own destiny. Armed with such a constitutional 
confirmation of personal autonomy, the individual citizen might then 
engage in the act of political association in an attempt actively to shape his 
own fate. In other words, whilst in the classical construction the citizen 
existed purely by virtue of common political interchange; in modem 
philosophy, the existence of an autonomous and rights-bearing citizen was 
instead a vital pre-condition for political association.
This shift in emphasis from political communality to rights-based 
individualism accordingly had a negative impact upon the powers of the 
political community. No longer was the polity to be regarded as fully self- 
determining. Rather, it need be constitutionally restrained: inviolate civic 
rights protecting and guaranteeing the individual citizen’s autonomous and 
politically constitutive identity. This constitutional restraint of the polity 
has consequently provided the general discussion on citizenship with some 
of its most enduring themes. Which individual rights need be protected 
from political interference? In how far should individual interests prevail 
above those of the political community? The United Kingdom is similarly 
no stranger to such debate. The development of the dual status of political 
citizen and legal subject, however, has nevertheless historically determined 
that this debate be framed in terms peculiar to the UK.
As famously noted,65 civic rights in England were not the product of a 
revolutionary constitution, but were the work of 17th and 18th Century 
jurisprudence. In slowly and meticulously supplementing ancient natural 
and procedural rights with newer economic and contractual rights,66 the 
Judges elevated the feudal vassal into an autonomous subject of the 
common law. In so doing, however, they similarly unleashed the creative 
capacities of individual Britons and so laid the foundations for later 
demands for rights of political citizenship.67 Alternatively, the political 
citizen was to grow out of the autonomous subject.
64 PreuB, ‘Zum verfassungstheoretischen Begriff des Staatsbiirgers in der modemen 
Gesellschaft,’ in idem (ed), Saatsbiirgerschaft mid Zuwanderung, (ZERP- 
Diskussionspapier 5/93, Bremen), 21-38.
65 Again, most famously by, T.H. Marshall, op cit, n i l .
66 The most famous of these being the writ of as Habeas Corpus.




























































































Vitally, however, in the UK setting rights of subjecthood were never 
simply to act as natural restraints upon the self-determining polity. Judges 
had no power to review Statue law. Rather, Parliament’s superior 
legislative power dictated that there invariably be a degree of tension 
between the political citizenry and a law which upheld the rights of the 
subject. Indeed, if it so wished the political community might simply set 
the subject’s rights aside. As Judge-made law, such civic rights did not 
carry the natural authority of constitutionally secured rights. Equally, 
however, as products of a law which derived its authority from judicial 
deliberation and a pre-democratic notion of monarchical rule, they would 
inevitably be the object of some suspicion in political circles: were Judges 
merely the neutral arbiters of the individual’s good, or were they the 
handmaidens of particularistic class or economic interests.68 *
Speaking formally, the UK’ s progression towards democracy seemed 
thus to have taken Britain back to the classical notion of a wholly self- 
determining polis. In common with France, the United Kingdom had 
evolved a comprehensive set of individual liberties conducive to the 
growth of inclusive political community.'’'' Unlike the French Republic, 
however, the UK had not enshrined such rights in higher law, leaving them 
vulnerable to the very political community whose growth they had 
precipitated. Returning from the theoretical to the factual, however, as 
many glowing evocations to the ‘Englishman’s love of liberty’ were to 
confirm, the political community nonetheless did hold a degree of respect 
for liberties, the rights of the subject being rarely if ever encroached upon.
In other words, further limiting factors seemed to be in play. The 
political community did not behave as a wholly self-determining unit. 
Instead it appeared to display a remarkable degree of self-restraint, leaving 
the subject’s rights in tact. This then provides one of the major questions to 
be tackled in relation to the position of the Briton which mechanism(s) 
regulated relations between the individual Briton subjects and the British 
political community?
3.3. Community vs Individualism
The use of the term political community in the UK setting raises, 
however, raises a further point of interest. Simply stated, the failure to
68 Cf.. Harald Laski, Parliamentary Government in England, (Allen & Unwin: London, 
1938).





























































































incorporate the polity within the British state, or to establish horizontal 
bonds of belonging between individual citizens, necessarily places a 
question mark over the notion that the UK citizenry constituted a 
‘community.’
As noted, the progression to citizenship had determined than an ever 
growing number of Britons be politically ‘autonomous.’70 Armed with the 
franchise, a not inconsiderable portion of the population was now 
emancipated from the direct control of others, and might so pursue its own 
perceived interests through the political process. With such an evolution, 
however, a strong streak of individualism seemed to have entered the 
United Kingdom. In common with certain of its continental neighbours. 
Britain was thus confronted with the perennial problem of maintaining 
internal social cohesion amongst a polity of diverse and possibly self- 
interested members, and of persuading the citizenry to exercise its new­
found powers with due respect for each other and for the interests of the 
political community as a whole. Unlike its European counterparts, 
however, the UK continued to eschew any positive normative 
commitments to republicanism. The polity was not to be incorporated. 
There existed no formal recognition of mutual rights or reciprocal duties. 
Formally speaking, the polity remained no more than a loose collection of 
individuals.71
In short, however, the United Kingdom seemed to lack formal 
instruments of internal cohesion. The republic was not a feature of British 
law. This, however, raises the second question in relation to citizenship 
development in the United Kingdom: what if any mechanisms regulated
70 Cf.. D. Heater/D. Oliver, The Foundations of Citizenship, op cit, n 60.
71 Equally, however, Britain appeared in certain respects at least to be insulated from 
the growing European trend of nationalism. In an age when national consolidation 
was seen as an imperative and had worked its way into most national concepts of 
citizenship via exclusive nationality law. the UK retained its inclusive view of 
Britishness, rejecting international pressure to define who were its nationals—most 
particularly, continuing to resist the demands of the old established (and white) 
Dominions, that a clear scheme of nationality be established within the British 
Empire, with the dominions gaining the right autonomously to identify their own 
citizens/nationals, cf.. A. Nicol/A. Dummet. Citizens, Subjects, Aliens and Others. 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1990) a demand often attributed the 'racist' 
desire of Dominions such as Canada and South Africa to deny entry to (black) British 
subjects from the Colonies. ‘Deep’ concepts of the nation had not evolved, and 
consequently the notion of a ‘national community’ appeared to be as elusive as that 




























































































relations between individual Britons, thus providing for a degree of social 
and political national cohesion?
3.4. Hierarchy vs Egalitarianism
As noted, citizenship is most commonly seen as being a matter of the 
progression from ‘the hierarchical to the horizontal, so that fixed positions 
of a formal status system begin to dissolve under the impact of 
universalistic democratic rights of citizenship.’72 The natural enemy of the 
citizen was thus the aristocrat of primogeniture whose claims to social and 
political dominance were based on no more than an accident of birth and a 
feudal view of society which saw each individual tied to his allotted rung 
in a hierarchical ladder of power. Alternatively, in Paine’s vivid prose, 
citizenship was a direct challenge to ‘aristocratic governments founded in 
conquest’ and the ‘base idea of man having property in man.’ Instead, 
universalistic rights of citizenship provided an opposing and constitutive 
view of man which saw ‘every individual bom equal in rights with his 
contemporary.’73 Men of equal rank might beak down hierarchy and 
establish new and egalitarian modes of social and political interaction. In 
other words, one of the primary elements within citizenship is the fact that 
it be founded upon horizontal and not hierarchical ties between 
individuals.
At the turn of the Century. English law was no stranger to the notion of 
egalitarianism. Most strikingly, civic rights attached to all individual 
Britons regardless of their personal status. A contradiction nevertheless 
arose in that beyond the sphere of rights, the law continued to formulate 
relations between the Briton and the British State in explicitly hierarchical 
terms. This, however was to occur in two ways. Most strikingly, the notion 
of subjecthood, being predicated upon ancient feudal notions of 
monarchical hierarchy, perforce dictated that each individual Briton stand 
in a hierarchical relationship to the Crown. Similarly, however, though 
somewhat less explicitly, the continued refusal of the Parliament formally 
to incorporate the political citizen within the British state, seemed likewise 
to place the political citizen on a lower footing than that Parliament which 
supposedly represented his will. In other words, the claim of the political 
Community that the Briton be a citizen and not a subject was flawed in one 
very fundamental aspect: the absence of higher laws and the primary 
constitutional tenet which located sovereign power not in the hands of the
72 B.S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism, (Unwin Hyman: London 1985).




























































































people, but in the Sovereign in Parliament, determined that the franchise 
never be fully secure from predatory parliamentary attentions. The 
citizen’s status thus being dependent upon simple legislative fiat rather 
than constitutional prescription, his very existence was thus always to be 
subject and subordinate to the whims of his representatives.74
Accordingly, a third question is raised as to citizenship evolution in the 
United Kingdom. Were such hierarchical ties merely the constitutional 
remnants of outmoded and ancient systems of government? Alternatively, 
did the position of the individual Briton once again diverge from more 
common paradigms of citizenship, with hierarchy continuing to play a 
significant role in political life?
B. The Constitutional Position of the Briton Re-Assessed
Given the issues raised by the discussion of whether the tum-of-the 
Century Briton be citizen or subject, the investigation now moves on more 
closely to consider the questions of subjecthood v.v citizenship, 
individualism v.v community, and hierarchy vs egalitarianism through a 
historical re-appraisal of UK (English) constitutional thought on the status 
of the individual Briton and the relationship of individuals to the British 
State. In particular, however, the analysis attempts to pinpoint exactly how 
the law received successive philosophical notions of individual autonomy 
and collective (state) sovereignty and subsequently incorporated them 
within the formal institutions of British social and political life—the 
assumption being that it was this exercise which gave rise to a peculiar and 
‘deep’ concept of the UK citizen.
In this latter regard, however, it is worth noting at the outset that UK 
legal and constitutional evolution seems to have followed a highly 
idiosyncratic path; and in particular—this likewise being a facet of the 
UK’s abiding philosophical preference for ‘negative’ rather than ‘positive’ 
liberalism—diverged from its continental and American counterparts by 
virtue of its enduring refusal ever to link or subsume ‘naturally-derived’ 
principles of individual autonomy with or within more positive state
74 Concerns that Parliament lie above the people remaining topical to this day with 
Charter 88, for example, claiming that the events of 1688 merely ‘shifted the absolute 
power of the Monarch into the hands of the parliamentary oligarchy,’ and 
furthermore arguing that this failure constutionally to incorporate the British citizen 
within the State was to enable the Thatcher ‘government to discipline British society 





























































































constructs. Accordingly, the study concentrates on three particularly 
weighty and characteristic moments in UK constitutional history. The first, 
Calvin's case, clearly demonstrating that notions of individual autonomy 
within the UK Constitution derived from the same natural law roots as did 
those of American and French legal thinking. The second, the publication 
of Blackstone’s Commentaries-, a body of legal scholarship which marks 
the beginnings of UK constitutional particularism—resisting the then 
current revolutionary trend to wed natural law to the positive law of the 
state, so preserving the individual Briton’s pre-statal identity. And the 
third, the publication of Dicey’s law of the Constitution; a work 
characteristic of a peculiarly British (English) form of legal positivism 
which with its roots in utilitarianism once again sets UK apart—being 
more concerned with assertion of the sovereignty of political institutions 
than with that of the British people.
1. Calvin’s Case
Calviu ’.v case is further chosen as the first moment in the evolution of a 
distinct constitutional status for the Briton for two reasons: first, since it 
was the source of the doctrine of allegiance and thus initiated the view of 
the Briton as a monarchical subject which was to dominate the perception 
of the individual Briton up until 1948; but secondly, since it also offers an 
authentic summary of the early 15th Century view of the nature of the 
British state and the relation of the individual Briton to that State.
1.2. Subjecthood as a Feudal Construction
In its origins a feudal doctrine derived from the Norman habit of 
inextricably binding vassals to their lords, allegiance was definitively laid 
down as a tenet of English law in the momentous Calvin's Case of 1608.75 76
Lord Coke presiding, took this opportunity to enunciate ‘the pure milk of 
the common law doctrine of allegiance,’’6 so finally formalising a general 
principle of law which dated as far back as the 13th Century.” 
Accordingly, in much the same manner as all those bom upon the land of a 
feudal Baron were placed under an obligation of fidelity and obedience to 
their Lord, so all bom within the dominion of the King were to become ad 
fidem regis—in the faith of the Sovereign—and so to owe him
75 (1608) 7 Co. Rep.
76 J. Mervyn Jones, British Nationality Law and Practice, (OUP: Oxford, 1947), 41.




























































































unquestioning loyalty. Equally, however, just as the fidelity and obedience 
of feudal vassals had its counterpart in a baronial duty to furnish 
‘protection and guardianship,’78 79the King too was obliged not only to 
‘govern and protect’ his subjects, but also ‘to maintain and serve them.’”
With this choice of a feudal idiom to describe the status of the individual 
Briton, the organicism within notions of ‘Britishness’ was bom. In 
inextricably linking the Briton to land, and in particular to the King’s land, 
British subjecthood was to develop its distinctly earthly feel: on the one 
hand, resulting in a perception that Britishness be a mere matter of an 
accidental territorial union between the individual Briton and the British 
state;80 and on the other, raising a presumption that in the absence of 
‘personal’ ties between Briton and state, the British subject be just that— 
an individual, accidentally and irrevocably subject to the laws of the state, 
and thus with little or no interest either in the fate of his fellow subjects or 
the workings of government.81
1.3. Subjecthood as a Hobbesian Construction?
Though most often viewed purely as a feudal construction, and thus 
obviously lacking that pragmatic element of post-feudal paction so integral 
to Leviathan, it is nonetheless tempting to conclude that the doctrine of 
allegiance and the status of subjecthood, indicate that the institutional 
thinking of the common law simply coalesce with the Hobbesian 
philosophical tenet that life in a state of nature be brutish and short, and 
that some undisputed authority be necessary to imitate the Divine moral 
order in which the individual might have a better chance of survival. Pre­
dating Leviathan, the doctrine of allegiance nonetheless seems to 
reproduce its underlying themes playing upon the individual Briton’s 
desire for succour and guardianship: offering protection and demanding in 
return that the subject unquestioningly submit to a sovereign authority 
whose primary duty it was to maintain moral order in society.
On such a reading, it would seem logical to conclude that the sole basis 
of the British Subject’s respect for the British State be that most primitive 
of conceptions, the desire for self-preservation. In defending the state’s 
borders and ensuring the moral order within those borders, the King’s law
78 J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance' (Part II), loc cit, n 31.
79 Lord Coke in Calvin's Case.





























































































simply represented the individual subject’s best bet for survival. 
Notwithstanding later glowing evocations of the status of the British 
subject as the ‘best position in the world,’82 subjecthood was thus in 
essence no more than a mere matter of personal survival. The British 
subject shared none of the positive ethical characteristics of the French 
Republican citizen. It was instead a mere reactive status; accepted only 
insofar as the sovereign might guard against the ever intrusive state of 
nature and guarantee moral order.
1.4. Natural Law and the Subject
Tempting as the simple equation of feudal allegiance with pragmatic 
Hobbesian principles of self-preservation through subjection may be, it is 
nevertheless here argued that to do so is fundamentally to misunderstand 
the historical nature of the common law and the origins and character of 
the British subject. The doctrine of allegiance dates from the 13th Century. 
Similarly, Calvin’s case was heard 50 years before Leviathan was set to 
paper. Allegiance was thus evolved not in age of positive philosophy, but 
at a time when law and religious morality were in any case seen as being 
inextricably linked with one another. In short, or so it may be argued, 
allegiance and the British subject are products not of later man-made 
schemes systematically to ape—albeit imperfectly—God’s order on earth, 
but of earlier human endeavours directly to translate Divine—yet 
material—values into law. Allegiance has its roots in natural law and not 
political philosophy. As a consequence, the characteristics of the British 
subject were to differ subtly but vitally from Hobbesian notions of 
subjection to the state. Most strikingly, there would appear to be an 
element in the doctrine of allegiance which indicates that it was a status 
positively embodying God-given values such as personal freedom, which 
might to a certain degree be defended against Hobbesian notions of 
unlimited sovereign power. It was the King’s Judges and not the King who 
formulated the doctrine of allegiance and secured the status of the subject. 
Ensuring that God’s prescriptions be reproduced on Earth was not to be 
merely a matter for a sovereign power’s Christian conscience. Rather, the 
law was to play a role in normatively shaping and controlling the exercise 
of sovereign power. In other words, an early albeit very restricted form of 
constitutional government appeared to be in operation: or, in Bracton’s 
phraseology the King had two things to fear—God and the law. 
Alternatively, the normative control and shaping of the sovereign power by




























































































the common law thus entailed a notion of the salus populi, or the idea that 
a King ruled not merely by divine right but in accordance with the mores 
of an accepted legal system upon which his subjects might upon call to 
restrain and limit the extent of his rule.8’
The claim that the common law doctrine of allegiance and subjecthood 
differ subtly but vitally from that of Hobbesian subjection, however, rests 
upon two premises: first, that uniquely amongst medieval legal systems, 
the common law had in some way insulated itself from the monarchical 
power from which it supposedly derived its authority; and secondly, that 
rather than take a negative approach to the maintenance of God’s moral 
order on earth, merely regulating the state of nature within the physical 
borders of state, the law actively promulgated substantive natural legal 
values, and in so doing was prepared to attempt not only substantively to 
direct the exercise of sovereign power, but also and most remarkably even 
to question the validity of established notions of statehood.
Lord Coke was thus a representative of a legal system distinguished 
amongst its European counterparts since it had early established itself as a 
professional and distinct institution of government. Though founded by 
•tefify II for the express purposes of effecting his political rule, a process 
Of very rapid professionalisation was to determine that by 1300 the Judges 
Constituted a distinct arm of government with their own dense web of rules 
and procedures no longer accessible to the layman.* 84 Equally, in age which 
considered law and morality to be inextricably linked with one another, 
ftuch professionalised Judges were developing their rules and procedures as 
O ttortnatively coherent body of law. Translated into practice, the natural 
■BXim that certain wrongs were mala in se rather than mala quia in 
ptohibita, determined that the liberties and rights of the subject were 
Mdained for men by the will of God, so that the work of the Judges
“ J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, (Clarendon: 
Oxford. 1955), at 53, a view confirmed by James I promise on his accession to the 
English throne to abide by the law. Kingship was a contract between Sovereign and 
people, a contract policed by the law. In James’ own words ‘the King bound himself 
by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom: Tacitly 
as by being a King, and so bound to protect as well the people as the laws of his 
kingdom; and expressly by his oath at his coronation; so as every just king in a 
settled kingdom is bound to observe that paction made to his people by his laws in 
framing his government agreeable thereunto according to that paction which God 
made with Noah after the deluge.’




























































































consisted mainly in upholding them.85 86Accordingly, the administration of 
law was to become more than a mere matter of neutrally executing the will 
of the sovereign power. Instead, a highly distinct, professionalised and 
ethically driven body of King’s Judges began normatively to shape and 
oversee the exercise of the King’s power. Rights to property and personal 
freedom were God given. It was not the business of man or indeed of 
human government to interfere with them.
It was thus against this background of a professionalised and distinctly 
natural legal system that Calvin’s case was decided. Accordingly, although 
Lord Coke’s use of a feudal idiom to describe the structures of government 
appeared to mirror elements within Leviathan, the underlying premises of 
the Judgement were nevertheless drawn from natural rather than 
Hobbesian principles.
To recap briefly on the facts of the case: the accession of James VI of 
Scotland to the English throne had raised the thorny issue of whether Scots 
were subjects merely of Scotland or also of England. Politically speaking, 
this was a matter of vital importance since the admission that Scots be 
subjects of the English Crown would negate their alien status in England, 
thus giving them access to the full privileges of the English law. As noted, 
there was much parliamentary opposition to such a move. However, the 
simple fact that the law had evolved as a professional institution dedicated 
to the oversight of the executive power, determined that Calvin’s suit was 
not to be decided purely on the grounds of political expediency, but rather 
in accordance with the substantive principles of natural law.
Reviewing Calvin’s Case from this perspective, it becomes apparent that 
Lord Coke’s decision was not merely concerned with the matter of 
establishing the nature of the relation of the individual Briton to his 
Sovereign, but was also dedicated to upholding man’s God given and thus 
universal rights to property and individual freedom. Pleading for Calvin, 
Bacon was clearly to lay down the thinking of the common law:
by the law of nature all men in the world are naturalised one toward the other; they 
are all made of one lump of earth, of one breath of God...It was civil and national 
laws that brought in these words of ‘civic’ and ‘extemus,’ alien and native. And 
therefore, because they tend to abridge the law of nature, the law favoureth not
them, but takes them strictly_[S]o...all national laws whatsoever are to be taken
strictly and hardly in any point w'herein they abridge and derogate from the law of 
nature.
85 J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History', op cit, n 83, 23.




























































































Liberty and property were the ordained right of man, merely secured by 
law. Man’s actions in creating states and nations, and thus in denying the 
alien access to the law and his natural birthright had upset this Divine 
scheme: Hobbes turned on his head. The common law sought to remedy 
this folly. Though it could not of itself destroy states and re-establish 'the 
original law of nature and the universal law of nations,’"7 it could at the 
very least ensure the widest possible access to the protection of the 
common law. Ius soli was not a mere matter of land and feudal loyalty, it 
was thus also expressive of the common law’s desire materially to promote 
Divine will, guaranteeing the inherent liberty and property of as many men 
as possible.'8
Vitally for the course of British history, the common law was in 
Calvin’s Case also to give material voice to its disapproval of the 
exclusionary effects of man made borders, itself stepping outside its own 
jurisdiction. In 1608 as today, English common law was just that, English. 
It did not have application in Scotland. In the one vital area of allegiance, 
however, the physical boundaries of such jurisdiction were broken. Those 
bom within the King’s dominions but outside the ambit of the common law 
were nevertheless given the same legal status as those bom within it. Scots 
were to be given status under English law, Therefore, as the boundaries of 
the later Empire evolved, those who found themselves within them became 
British subjects not through political grant as was the case in ancient 
Rome,8'' but by natural right. As time progressed, and colonies became self- 
governing dominions, the extension of British subjecthood across the 
borders of many states and many nations was thus fully in accordance with 
the logic of the law.87 90
87 Lord Ellesmere, pleading for Calvin.
88 As a vital aside, however, it should be noted that although 16th Century common law 
claimed to guide the exercise of executive power, it might not be regarded as an early 
form of fundamental law. As has been noted (J.W. Gough, op cit n 83), such ancient 
natural legal 'pnnciples may be called fundamental, not so much because they could 
not be legally assailed as because it was assumed that no legal authority would wish to 
assail them.’ In other words, the claim of the common law to uphold certain substantive 
normative values was always a fragile one. If Kings or a legislatively supreme 
Parliament should have determined ‘evil desires upon them,’ the common law could in 
fact do little to positively protect the liberty of the person or property rights.
89 In contradiction of, D. Heater/D. Oliver, The Foundations of Citizenship, op cit, n 60.
90 Infra, in.A.l, for the awkward post-war political consequences of the extra­





























































































If anything might be said to explain the extraordinary historical 
resonance of the status of the British subject, it is quite possibly this 
commitment to a non-national and non-state based recognition of the 
natural rights of man. A substantive vision every bit as inspiring as the 
French declaration of the Rights of man and the Citizen, British 
subjecthood had but little to do with a Hobbesian notion of simple 
subjection to a single sovereign state. Rather, it was precisely the fact that 
it extended substantive rights beyond any narrow and ‘unnatural’ 
conception of the nation or the state which gave it such emotional force.
Such a conclusion, however, raises two vital points of interest. First, the 
characterisation of subjecthood as an inspiring product of natural law, 
necessarily requires a re-assessment of the somewhat negative appraisals 
of the ‘organicism’ of the concept of British subjecthood.91 Thus, whilst 
Lord Coke’s choice of a feudal construction to capture the essence of 
Calvin’s relationship with his King, might on one purely factual level be 
claimed' to have created a territorial rather than personal relationship 
between the Briton and the British state, this idiomatic earthiness may 
nonetheless be argued to have masked certain more inspirational 
considerations. Though British subjecthood was thus forever to lack the 
element of voluntarism which was to find its way into both French and 
American concepts of citizenship, and the British subject was consequently 
to continue to be ‘bom’ rather than ‘made.’ his allegiance to the British 
state was predicated upon far more than the mere bartering of fidelity for 
protection. Rather, the status of British subjecthood was to bring with it 
this one vital guarantee: no person bom within the Realm would ever be 
excluded from the protection of the law, or from the enjoyment of natural 
rights. Accordingly, whilst no formal ties were to be created between 
individual Britons, they were nonetheless to share in the ‘common’ 
protection of a law which fully recognised their quality as ‘natural’ 
individuals.
Equally, however, the specifically natural law roots of the British 
subject, raise the interesting question of why, given subsequent 
developments in political philosophy, subjecthood was to remain a 
relatively static concept and was not to evolve in much the same manner as 
was the revolutionary notion of French citizenship? In explanation: 
English common lawyers were far from being the sole purveyors of
91 See in particular, J.W. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (Part I), loc cit, n 27,




























































































‘rational natural law.’92 934Rather, this natural view of man was clearly 
derived from a common European tradition.” Thus, in a later French 
setting, the rational natural notion that all individuals be bom equal in 
right, was inexorably to be wedded with notions of territorially delimited 
sovereign power, was likewise to be translated into positive constitutional 
values, and was so to give birth to the concept of the Citoyen. This 
particular marriage of natural law with political philosophy may thus be 
argued to have had two vital consequences: on the one hand, determining 
that the territorial state (or nation), no longer be viewed as being disruptive 
of the natural rights of man, and instead be seen as their natural guardian: 
and on the other, leading to the positive constitutional expression of 
individual rights, so marking a fundamental break with classical 
citizenship and the favouring of the ‘second’ citizen above the polish
Despite a strong ‘national’ tradition of political philosophy, lawyers in 
the United Kingdom were not, however, to adapt their perception of the 
individual Briton to suit the strictures of a modem age: British subjecthood 
continued to apply across the borders of many nations and many states; 
equally, natural rights, ever fragile, were never to be given positive and 
unassailable legal expression as constitutional individual rights. The 
/easons for this failure (and others), however, are to be found in the further 
examination of the particular manner of the reception of political 
philosophy—and philosophical views on the individual Briton—within 
English constitutionalism.
2. Blackstone ’s Commentaries
Moving on through history, a second determining moment in the 
evolution of the constitutional position of the individual Briton, was to 
pome with the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries in the years 
1765-9. Over four volumes of densely written prose, Blackstone was to 
tutempt systematically to order the vast jurisprudence of the common law 
so as to provide a coherent and comprehensive description of the English 
Constitution and legal system. Consciously designed to promote university 
involvement in legal education and to educate the landed classes in the 
workings of British government, the Commentaries were an endeavour to 
draw up ‘a general map of the law, marking out the shape of the country,
92 Or in modem German terms, Vemunftsreclit.
93 J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, (Clarendon: 
Oxford, 1955), 23.




























































































it's connections and boundaries, it's greater divisions and principal 
c i t i e s . A  creature of their time, the four volumes made little or no 
distinction between constitutional law, or the frame of government, and the 
more general system of private law; the 18th Century usage of the term 
‘constitutional’ having but little in common with more modem notions of a 
higher law secure from the predatory attentions of the legislature. Rather, 
Blackstone sought to give an overview of the ‘constituted.’ or ‘existing 
arrangement of governmental institutions, laws and customs, together with 
the principles and goals which animated them.’% Such an overview, 
however, was to prove of vital significance to the status of the individual 
Briton.
Whereas Calvin's case had been concerned solely with the 
establishment of the individual Briton’s ‘civic’ status under a law and 
within a system of government which as yet had very little conception of 
the notion of political community; Blackstone’s commentaries followed 
upon the evolution of a nascent democratic’ system and so began to 
address the question of where the individual stood in relation to—not a 
simple hereditary sovereign—but an increasingly ‘inclusive’ body politic 
or state. In this regard, however. Blackstone's analysis of then current 
philosophical thinking becomes noteworthy for two reasons; first, 
explicating and justifying the law’s refusal to admit of voluntarism and/or 
the incorporation of the individual Briton within the British state; and 
secondly, emphasising the Briton’s continuing and ‘pre-statal’ natural 
status with personal liberty being expressed not through positive ‘higher’ 
law, but within an extensive private sphere not only existing prior to the 
state, but also delimited and governed not by political edict, but by the 
common (and customary) notion of the rule of law.
2.1. Privilege Preserved: Locke Rejected?
On one reading. Blackstone’s powerful exposition of law and 
government is all about defence: the preservation of an antiquated and 
illogical law, and a privileged-based system of government, against more 
modem philosophical and revolutionary forces9’ . First, the common law *97
Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Chicago University Press: Chigaco 1979), 
1:35.
% Bernard Bailyn, quoted by Stanley N. Katz, in introduction to, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, op cit, n 95.





























































































itself was being called increasingly into question: the manifold inequities 
of a complex, contradictory and creaking Judge-made law casting positive 
and codified schemes of civilian law in an increasingly attractive light. 
Accordingly, certain of the volumes’ most pungent criticisms were 
reserved for the purveyors of a civil law system which was deeply tainted 
by the ‘despotic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium.Secondly , and more 
importantly, however, evolutions in positive philosophy were similarly 
threatening the entire and ancient scheme of British government, and a 
large part of the work was therefore seemingly dedicated to justifying and 
preserving existing governmental institutions.
The primary plank in this mission to defend the existing constituted 
institutions of British government against possibly revolutionary 
philosophical advance was the denial that sovereignty reside in the British 
people and the re-affirmation of the executive sovereignty of the ‘supreme 
magistrate’ the King, and of the legislative sovereignty of a Parliament 
comprising the three estates of the King. Lords and Commons. Though 
clearly impressed by Locke’s treatise that:
there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the 
legislature, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: 
for when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those who 
gave it,91'
he could agree with it only ‘in theory.’"1" Clearly belonging to that 
section of the section of the British establishment which remained 
traumatised by regicide, civil war and the general perceived lawlessness of 
proto-socialist groups such as the levellers, Blackstone rejected Locke's 
contractarian notion of popular sovereignty with a wholly positivistic 
argument which nonetheless readily betrayed his underlying fears that such 
a notion might lead the UK back to a nasty and brutish state of nature. 
Locke’s conclusion was ‘just’ but might not be accepted:
under any dispensation of government at present actually existing. For this 
devolution of power, to the people at large, includes in it a dissolution of the 
whole form of government established by that people, reduces all the members to *
,s 1.5. Similarly. In a move of some cunning. Blackstone was likewise to attribute the 
failings in the common law to the subversive influences of the 'foreign clergy.’ who 
had entered Britain 'in shoals' with the Nonmans, and whose promulgation of the 
canon law version of civil law had upset the perfect scheme of common law evolved 
under Saxon government. If there were failing in English law. this was clearly the 
fault of the ‘popish clergy,’ I. 16.1. 17.





























































































their original state of equality, and by annihilating the sovereign power repeals all 
positive laws whatsoever before enacted. No human laws will therefore suppose a 
case, which must at once destroy all law. and compel men to build afresh upon a 
new foundation; nor will they make provision for so desperate event, as must 
render all legal provisions ineffective. So long therefore as the English 
constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is 
absolute and without control.101 *
That Blackstone. a Whig, sympathised with Locke was readily 
demonstrated by his confirmation that government be established by the 
people. In his view, however, establishment was a one way process. Post 
James II, Blackstone was confident in stating that English King’s 
possessed executive sovereignty not by jure divino. but ‘by the general 
consent of the people,’ the evidence of which was ‘long and immemorial 
usage.’,o: The rub in this construction, however, was that consent, once 
given, might not be withdrawn. The supreme power (legislative and 
executive) lay not in the people but in Parliament. Thus, whilst in Locke’s 
analysis the people formed the body politic; in Blackstone’s, it was ‘the 
King and these three estates—lords temporal, spiritual and commons who 
together form the great corporation or body politic of the Kingdom’10' 
Blackstone’s notion that the existing scheme of government in Britain 
be based on the irreversible consent of the people was itself founded upon 
a fairytale: the notion that a wise and just Saxon polity had irrevocably 
transferred its sovereign power to a single a person, so transforming a state 
of nature into a civil society and laying the basis for all future 
constitutional evolution. Quite simply fabulous and with little or no basis 
in fact, the fiction of abiding Saxon ‘consent’ was nevertheless to prove 
surprisingly influential in legal circles.104 and was thus to join with other 
factors in contributing to an abiding respect for the notion of parliamentary 
rather than popular sovereignty. Far more significant in this respect, 
however, was Blackstone’ s apparent underlying motivation for rejecting a 




104 Remarkably, this notion was to deeply influence legal thinking right up until the time 
of Dicey. Dicey himself sought to dispel the myth dismissing as ridiculous the notion 
‘that every step towards civilisation has been a step backwards towards the simple 
wisdom of our uncultured ancestors,’ Dicey. Law of ilie Constitution, (Eighth 




























































































structures of government: the conservatism which derived from a fear of a 
return to the lawlessness of a state of nature.
Barely a Century after the disturbing events of the civil war. the spectre 
and consequences of civil disorder still loomed large in the imagination."1' 
Though Locke’s liberal theories were particularly appealing to a common 
law mind, to no small extent reproducing the ancient legal notion of the 
salus populi, their inclusion within the constitution would necessarily 
involve great institutional upheaval. To admit of Locke’ primary thesis of 
the inherent political and not just civil equality of man, would as a matter 
of logic require the levelling of the three political estates. Not only the 
Monarch, but also the Church and Aristocracy need so be reduced to the 
Common’s level. That such a step might be taken without a degree of 
social upheaval, however, seemed beyond the bounds of possibility. It was 
thus surely to be rejected for fear that it rekindle the fires of civil and 
social disorder so recently dampened. In short: peace was to be prized 
above constitutional perfectionism. The perfect constitutional translation 
of the positive mores of moral philosophy had advantages ‘in theory.’ Such 
normative gains, however, were always to be measured against the more 
immediate threat of civil strife. Though the confirmation of parliamentary 
sovereignty ran counter to contemporary developments in liberal theory, 
preserving privileged government, denying the political equality and 
sovereignty of the individual Briton, and in theory even posing a threat to 
the preservation of common law civic rights, it was nevertheless to be 
preferred above the horrors of social upheaval.
a) Privilege Justified
Importantly, Blackstone was not content with merely preserving 
privileged and explicitly hierarchical government. Instead, in a intellectual 
move which was to have profound and lasting effects upon the position of 
the individual Briton, he sought to justify the preservation of the three 
estates within the sovereign parliament with the argument that such 
distinctions, or in technical parlance the mixed constitution, contribute to 
the evolution of an optimal polity, displaying all the characteristics of 
‘supremacy, wisdom, goodness and power.’105 06
A variation upon the theme of the balance of powers, the notion of the 
mixed constitution nevertheless varied vitally from it, ascribing to each





























































































estate distinct functional characteristics of wisdom, goodness and power, 
which when brought together would not only act as a check upon each 
other, but would coalesce to give good government. The ancients had 
admitted of only three regular forms of government:
the first, when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting 
of all the members of a community, which is called a democracy: the second when 
it is lodged in a Council, composed of select members, and then it is styled an 
aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the hands of a single person, and then 
it takes the name of a monarchy.10’
Each such form of government had its distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. A democracy supplied ‘public virtue,’ ‘goodness of 
intention,’ and ‘a degree of patriotism.’ Popular assemblies, however, were 
also ‘frequently foolish.’ Aristocracies on the contrary, supplied a greater 
degree of ‘wisdom; being composed, or intended to be composed, of the 
most experienced citizens.’ Such virtues were nevertheless always to be 
balanced against aristocratic dishonesty and weakness. Finally, the 
monarchy was the most powerful form of government, ‘all the sinews of 
government being knit together, and united in the hands of the prince.’ But 
then again, the monarchy brought with it the imminent danger that strength 
be deployed to improvident or oppressive purposes.’107 08 *10
A fourth form of government, composed of all such qualities, had 
appeared to the ancients to be no more than a visionary whim: a form of 
government which might never be lasting or secure.100 In Blackstone’s 
analysis, however, the British Constitution was ‘a standing exception to 
the truth of this observation.’"0 Instead, the British people had perfected 
such mixed government, mixing and matching the functional qualities of 
the three estates so that they complement and check one another:
For, as with us the executive power of the land is lodged in a single person, they 
have all the advantages of strength and dispatch, that are to be found in the most 
absolute monarchy: and, as the legislature of the Kingdom is entrusted to three 
distinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the King; secondly, the 
lords spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratic assembly of persons selected 
for their piety, their birth, their valour, or their property; and thirdly, the house of 
commons, freely chosen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a 
kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different springs, and 
attentive to different interests, composes the British Parliament, and has the
107 1.49.
,0K 1.49-50.





























































































supreme disposal of everything: there can be no inconvenience attempted by either 
of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two: each branch 
being armed with a negative power, sufficient to repel any innovation which it 
shall think inexpedient or dangerous."1
The inherent civic virtue of the third estate would lead it to check the 
dishonesty of aristocracy; the wisdom which attached to noble birth would 
override the folly of the general populace; and the two estates acting 
together would act as an effective check of the despotic tendencies of a 
sovereign monarchical power which was nonetheless a vital pre-condition 
for effective government."2
b) Civic Virtue and the Common Good
Beyond providing the UK with an optimal form of government, 
however, the formalisation of the three estates and thus of social inequality 
within the sovereign parliament, were argued also have to a beneficial 
effect upon the social and civic attitudes of the populace as a whole: the 
system of rank and privilege serving the ancient aims of civic 
republicanism, and exhorting the Briton to greater individual effort in the 
service of the community. The ‘distinction of rank and honours’ were 
necessary ‘in order to reward such as are eminent in their services to the 
public, in a manner the most desirable to individuals, and yet without 
burthen to the community; exciting therefore an ambitious yet laudable 
ardour and generous emulation in others.’"' The gift of nobility remained 
within the hands of the King, and he in the old feudal manner would 
dispense of such honour only to those who adequately demonstrated that 
their personal ambition be compatible with and thus ‘subservient to the 
public good.’ The pursuit of personal honour ‘so dangerous and invidious 
in a mere republic,’ might under a free monarchy be controlled and 
directed to the purposes of the public good: the formalised scheme of rank 
being one and at the same time a incentive to personal ambition yet a check 
on destructive egotism.
Cohesive community, or the public good, however, was also seemingly 
served by restrictions placed on the franchise to the Commons. Notion’s 123
111 1.50-51.
112 As an important aside, the notion of ‘balance’ seemed equally to pervade the make­
up of the Commons: two distinct groups being represented; the Knights of the shire 
representing minor land owning interest, the citizens ‘the mercantile or trading 





























































































comparable with the Rousseauean ideal of radical democracy had yet to 
fully permeate the 18th Century mind. Blackstone’s was no exception. 
Whilst he conceded that ‘upon the true theory and genuine principles of 
liberty, every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote 
in electing those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of 
his property, his liberty and his life;’ such a view was nevertheless to be 
tempered by the requirement that the democratic polity be made up of ‘free 
agents.’ In other words, the democratic polity need be made up of equals to 
ensure a measured weighing up of issues. Only free agents might interact 
‘upon a level with each other,’ and accordingly persons of ‘indigent 
fortune’ or such as were ‘under the immediate dominion of others’ were to 
be denied the franchise since they were ‘esteemed to have no will of their 
own.’"'
Such views were common throughout contemporary Europe, and in 
Britain as on the continent, were to loose their persuasive power as the 
forces of radical democracy grew stronger."5 Another of Blackstone’s 
prescriptions, designed to harness the democratic polity to the higher needs 
of the common good, however, was to leave a lasting impression upon the 
British Constitution. District based representative government was thus to 
be preferred above all others forms for two reasons. First, the use of 
constituencies or ‘minute and separate districts’ which chose 
representatives was no more than an attempt to retain some of the intimacy 
of classical city-based government in a modem Nation-State setting. In 
such small areas ‘voters might easily be identified.’"6 The polity was local 
and immediate and thus encouraging of active participation and mutual 
control. Secondly, however, representatives once chosen by a local district 
became servants of the nation, and not of the constituency from which they 
originated. Representation was distinct from mandation. Representatives 
were not the handmaidens of their constituencies. Instead, the aim of their 
presence within parliament was ‘not particular but general; not barely to 
advantage constituents, but the common wealth.’"7 The benefits of such a 
form of democratic polity government were thus twofold being 
encouraging both of active citizenship participation and of the national 
common good. 1456
1141.165.






























































































2.2. The Birth of the Liberal Constitution?
In one analysis, Blackstone was quite simply a ‘toady.’"* His excessive 
concern not only to preserve but also to justify the preservation of privilege 
within the scheme of British government was deeply reactionary; 
contributing to the perpetuation of a British civil society based on rank and 
privilege, or the notion that each individual Briton be irrevocably tied to a 
distinct rung in a hierarchical social ladder. Status was thus to be the 
defining characteristic of British society and of the British polity. Where 
one stood in the social and political hierarchy dictated one’s position in the 
polity. Personal characteristics were imputed to social standing. The 
indigent were without a free will. The citizen or burgess was virtuous and 
patriotic but frequently foolish. The aristocratic ‘displayed that delicacy of 
sentiment so peculiar to noble birth’ and were thus wise but also inherently 
dishonest. The monarch a true Leviathan, but with disturbing despotic 
tendencies. Each according to his positive characteristics would be allotted 
a distinct place in the polity: a position likewise designed to restrain and 
curb his worst failings.
That such a status-based polity be attributed to the ‘consent’ of the 
populace, the ‘evidence of which was long and immemorial usage,’ has 
been described as an unashamed perversion of Locke’s political 
philosophy."5 The underlying theme of contractarian government, popular 
consent to government, being taken out of its egalitarian setting and 
transposed to a governmental system where men appeared not to be rights- 
bearing political equals, but status-bound members of distinct social and 
thus political and non-political classes: a deeply illiberal view of the 
Briton, predicated upon inherited difference and imputed personal 
characteristics rather than on inherent and natural equality.
Such a stark statement notwithstanding, there are nevertheless many 
indications that Blackstone’s was a far more liberal view of the position of 
the individual Briton than yet presented. His disagreement with Locke was 
a practical and not a theoretical one. He had integrated modem political 
philosophy within his thinking so far as to concede that under the ‘true and 
genuine’ principles of liberty, all men, no matter how poor, should have 
say in the disposal of their life and property. Similarly, if changes were to 
be made in the system of British government ‘it should be in favour of a
"“ Stanley N. Katz, in introduction to. Commentaries on the Laws o f England, op cit, n 
95.




























































































more complete representation of the people.’120 Indeed, though couched in 
the natural law terms of the times. Blackstone’s introduction to the 
Commentaries made immediately plain his comprehensive commitment to 
the primary tenet of liberal philosophy, the inherent equality of man:
The absolute rights of man. considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment 
to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear 
to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, 
and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists 
properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, 
unless by the law of nature: being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the 
gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free 
will.'21
Anticipating the imminent North American constitutional settlement, 
however, Blackstone did not merely see all ‘men as created equal.’ Instead, 
he re-iterated the important role that law played in securing the inherent 
equality of man through its view' of all men as bearers of certain absolute 
or natural ‘rights’: rights which were legally secured and which firmly 
anchored the notion of liberty within the United Kingdom:
And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted 
even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls 
under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes to  
instanli a freeman.1"
Alternatively, a restatement of the classical liberal construction w'hereby 
individual rights be recognised by law' so securing both the natural equality 
of the individual and freedom throughout a society.
Blackstone’s Commentaries are thus open to a second interpretation. He 
was not merely engaged in justifying an existing social order based on 
rank, privilege and imputed characteristics. Rather, his mission was of a far 
more ambitious nature. In cataloguing and arranging a diffuse body of 
judge-made law. politically expedient institutions and historical 
compromises on the distribution of power, all the while claiming that such 
apparently random legislative acts and judicial pronouncements conform to 
a higher and coherent logic, he was reinventing the common law and 
political system of the United Kingdom, so giving birth to the protean 
liberal constitution.* 12 As a piece of logical philosophy, such an endeavour
i:" 1.166.
,:i 1.121.
122 1.123. Emancipation effected by common law jurisprudence prior to statutory 
confirmation.




























































































has been termed ‘supremely unconvincing,’1" and indeed Blackstone's 
residual reliance on historical myths such as the enlightened Saxon polity 
was to be treated with contempt by subsequent constitutional thinkers.'" 
Nevertheless, the Commentaries were to prove extraordinarily influential 
in framing the terms of the liberal constitutional debate; terms which were 
followed by political writers from Bentham to Austin to Mill. Far more 
importantly, however, Blackstone’s description and justification of the 
constitutional and legal system proved convincing enough in legal circles 
to preserve the scheme of law and government substantially as it was. so 
having profound effects both on the further evolution of the UK 
constitution and on the position of the individual Briton. Whilst American 
and French Revolutionaries sought to iron out the lacunae and 
inconsistency in what was perceived to be an incomplete and illogical 
constitution,'26 so giving rise to coherent and distinct notions of citizenship, 
the UK was to continue to adhere to its ad hoc constitution and (in rigid 
citizenship terms) curiously incomplete view of the position of the 
individual Briton.
a) The Rule of Law: Right vs Right and Power vs Right
At the core of Blackstone’s attempt to re-invent the English common 
law and the British scheme of government as a coherent and logical 
system, lay the classical liberal dilemma of how to balance individual right 
against individual right and individual right against common power.'27 In 
being the first English constitutionalist to tackle this conundrum, however, 
Blackstone was undertaking at least two tasks; the first, the modernisation 
of the common law, so taking it away from indistinct natural law notions of 
the salus populi, and incorporating within it more precise and positivistic 
notions of Hobbesian sovereignty. The second, the formalisation and 124567
124 Ibid. 263.
125 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, Eighth Edition, (MacMillan: London: 1926).
126 Revolutionary dissatisfaction with the complex and incoherent nature of the UK 
constitution perhaps best expressed by Thomas Paine, ‘Absolute governments (tho’ 
the disgrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that they are simple; if 
the people suffer they know the head from which their suffering springs, know 
likewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures. But the 
constitution of England is so exceedingly complex that the nation may suffer for 
years together without being able to discover in which part the fault lie, some will say 
in one and some in another, and every political physician will advise a different 
remedy’ (Common sense).




























































































categorisation of existing but not yet rationalised notions of the rule of law, 
so creating a mediating barrier between private rights and between rights 
and power.128
The attempt to portray the evolving scheme of British government and 
law as a mechanism whereby individual rights and public power might be 
balanced against one another revolved around three themes. First, the 
division of rights into natural and relative rights, and the portrayal of 
government as a purely functional instrument whose primary aim was to 
maintain natural rights or ‘residual liberty.' Second, a statement that judges 
and the common law derive their authority directly from the sovereign 
Crown, but nevertheless be independent from it, enforcing a higher 
‘natural’ law and the customary law of the people. And thirdly, the 
formalisation of the rule of law as a mediating boundary between 
sovereign power and the rights of the people and between the rights of 
individual Britons.
b) Natural, Absolute and Relative Rights
To begin, however, with the distinction between natural or absolute 
rights and relative rights. Absolute rights were rights vested in man in a 
state of nature. Relative, those ‘which are incident (to man) as members of 
society, and standing in various relations to each other.’12'’ Further, absolute 
rights were those of property, liberty, personal security and personal 
honour.130 Vitally for the course of British constitutional history, however, 
such rights were not to be given legal expression as positive rights 
attaching to individuals. Rather, they were best to be conceived of a 
liberties protected not by positive normative expression, but by the scheme 
of relative rights which created a civil society, conducive of the good order 
and social success which allowed for the preservation of as much natural 
liberty as was possible in a social setting. The preservation of natural 
liberty was the sole aim of civil society, and should law or government 
indulge in any other activity it be considered distinctly uncivil:
Political therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no 
other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no further) as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the publick. Hence we may 
collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow 































































































but every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether 
practised by a monarch, a nobility or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny.1'1
Blackstone admitted of Locke’s reasoning that law and law alone 
created liberty.13 32 This it did, however, not by any foolish attempt to 
positivise man’s God-given, and thus logically boundless liberty, but by 
the construction of a social order which restricted natural liberty only 
insofar as was necessary for the maintenance of order. Anticipating Mill. 
Blackstone deemed good and successful law and government to be that 
which restricted itself to the maintenance of good order, leaving the 
individual subject as great a degree of natural liberty as be possible. Law 
was necessary:
but then on the other hand, that constitution or frame of government, that system 
of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty which leaves the subject entire 
master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good 
requires some direction or restraint.133
Government should have one purpose, the preservation of natural 
liberty. A Government that achieved such a goal was doing no more than 
preserve the natural rights of man. Accordingly, Blackstone might state 
with confidence that:
[T]he absolute rights of every Englishman (which taken in a political and 
extensive sense, are usually called their liberties) as they are founded on nature 
and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government.134
Unlike post-revolutionary Americans or Frenchmen, the Briton was not 
to be constituted by positive rights. Instead, the Briton was what he had 
ever been, a inherently autonomous being, whose natural liberty it was the 
sole purpose of civil government to preserve. The individual was not an 
adjunct to but existed independently from and prior to society. In a social 
setting, government and law were a necessary evil, but were legitimate 
only to the extent that they served the individual, not creating his liberty, 
but preserving it. This, a classic statement of the abiding ‘negative 
liberalism’ of the British Constitution thus furnished Blackstone with a 
simple yet far-reaching justification for the existence of sovereign power : 
it was there not to give positive expression to society’s demands, but rather 
to preserve the individual’s God-given identity.
131 1.122.































































































A vital component within Blackstone’ s constitutional attempt to 
preserve the natural liberty of the Briton, however, was the social 
legitimacy and independence of the common law or the Judges. With an 
eye to the Hobbesian demand that there be but one sovereign power within 
the state, Blackstone conceded that the law derived its authority from the 
Sovereign. Judicial power was a part of the Royal prerogative. The King 
was thus ‘the fountain of justice.’ With an equal regard to Locke, however, 
the King was not ‘the author or original’ of justice ‘but only the 
distributor’ of an ‘original power of judicature, [which] by the fundamental 
principles of society, is lodged in the society at large.’ A source of justice 
which had for reasons of convenience been transferred to the King and his 
substitutes to act as a ‘steward of the public.’1” The judiciary were the 
King’s substitutes and in turn:
by the long and uniform usage of many ages, our Kings have delegated their whole 
judicial power to the judges of their several courts; which are the grand repository 
of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated 
jurisdiction, regulated by certain and established rules, which the Crown itself 
cannot now alter but by act of parliament.135 36
In other words, the Judges were legitimated both as guardians of 
society’s justice and as delegates of the sovereign power. They were, 
however, similarly fully independent from the crown and detached from 
society or the public to the extent that their status might only be altered 
through act of parliament.
d) The Rule o f  Law
The independence of the judiciary was in turn vital since they, through 
the notion of ‘the rule of law’ were to mediate both between the sovereign 
power and the liberties of individuals, and between the rights of 
individuals themselves. In a dual construction, the rule of law demarcated 
the barrier between government and society so attempting to ensure that 
government serve the preservation of natural liberty, and drew the lines 
between individual Britons, so equally safeguarding the maintenance of 
civility within the private sphere of British society.
In explanation: though the absolute legislative sovereignty of parliament 






























































































form of judicial review, the ancient common law doctrine that 'the King 
can do no wrong,’ at once confirmed such sovereignty and opened up the 
way for the Judges to police the exercise of sovereign power, ensuring that 
no person might falsely cloak themselves with such authority to do 
violence to the liberties which lay at the heart of the British constitution. 
Rights were natural and unlimited, but might not be enjoyed in a social 
setting without a sovereign power to limit and enforce them. Such 
sovereign power, however, was legitimate only to the extent that it served 
the preservation of natural liberty. To that end. the sovereign power was 
‘hedged,’ or controlled, both by procedural rules and institutional 
arrangements, including the limitation of the crown prerogative, the 
distinction between executive and legislative sovereignty and the division 
of powers between the three estates. Any act which did not conform to 
such procedural rules or institutional, arrangements was thus no longer part 
of a scheme of government ‘coeval with....the absolute rights of every 
Englishman’ and might so be judicially restrained.
In other words, the exercise of any authority outside the ambit of the 
sovereign power was a private act and thus subject to the control of the 
common law or the customary law of the land.1'7 According to Blackstone, 
customary law was just that: law based on the custom of the people which 
was deciphered by judges on the basis of learning, reason and judicial 
precedent. The judiciary were:
the depository of the laws: the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of 
doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land.
Their knowledge of that law is derived from experience and study..... and from
being long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors.IMI
Alternatively, customary or common law had a double legitimacy. First, 
as the law of the people ‘which carries this internal evidence of freedom 
along with it. that it was probably introduced by the voluntary consent of 
the people.1” And secondly, as a judicially collated body of law, founded 
upon reason and judicial precedent. 157
157 This is a vital point, explaining the failure of the British Constitution to develop any 
form of distinct administrative or public law. Alternatively, as the legislature and 
executive are sovereign, they might do no wrong and might not be subject to judicial 
review. Any act falling outside such power, however, be a private act. and thus 
subject to review by the normal law of the land. In other words, failure to observe 






























































































Outside the distinct sphere of civil government (or statute law), the 
common or customary law of the land thus sought to regulate relations 
between private individuals, balancing right against right according to the 
established custom of the land, and the higher logic of the natural law of 
the Kingdom. The rule of law therefore had a dual function: firstly, 
demarcating the sovereign power from the private sphere: and secondly, 
maintaining social order amongst individual Britons, so attempting to 
preserving their individual liberty.
2.3. Conclusion
If it be accepted that Blackstone was not merely a reactionary, 
concerned exclusively with the preservation of privilege and outmoded 
government, his primary achievement must be recognised to be his 
reformulation of the entire existing body of common law, political practice 
and governmental structures to include within it modem philosophical 
considerations: most vitally, combining Hobbesian principles of sovereign 
power with a Lockean view of the equal rights of man to establish the 
pivotal and mediating notion of the rule of law. and so give birth to the 
protean liberal constitution.1'"
However, as already noted. Blackstone’s efforts were likewise tainted by 
his deep conservatism and his fear of a return to the lawlessness of civil 
war, and so carefully crafted to ensure the preservation of existing 
structures of government and to avert any radical (and in his view 
dangerous) measures of reform. Accordingly, whilst new philosophical 
thoughts were to be incorporated within the constitution, such thoughts 
were nonetheless to be tailored and re-arranged to secure institutional 
continuity. In the opinion of one commentator, such an exercise ultimately 
entailed an ashamed perversion of the political philosophy of 
commentators such as Locke.1,1 Whilst this may be argued to be an 
overstatement, to the extent that Blackstone’s mission was indeed a 
success and his defence of the existing British institutions was to set the 
terms of constitutional debate for the next two centuries, the curious nature 
of his philosophical tinkering may nonetheless in large part explain the 
evolution of a rather incomplete and contradictory constitutional view of 
the British state, the Briton and the relationship between the two. 140





























































































Most strikingly, his curious view of contractarian government, which 
revolved around the somewhat mythological notion that a wise and just 
Saxon polity had irrevocably transferred its sovereign powers to a 
‘supreme magistrate,’ or monarch, who in turn had chosen to exercise his 
sovereign power together with an aristocratic and spiritual estate and the 
representatives of the third estate, determined that the British body politic 
be made up not of the people, as Locke foolishly would have it, but of the 
Sovereign in Parliament. Justifying privilege and hierarchy and preserving 
it within the political community, such a view was not only to ensure that 
the British political citizen be forever forced to coexist and co-operate with 
his natural aristocratic enemy, but was also to act as a solid bulwark 
against the incorporation of the British people within the British state. 
Whilst a revolutionary France was thus to begin the long process of a 
return to the classical conception of the state as a set of fellow-members, or 
citizens, incorporated within one body, the United Kingdom would 
continue to adhere to its curiously detached view of a British people which 
was represented within, but did not itself make up the body politic or state.
Given the detached nature of the British people, the continued 
determination of who might be British through an organic and non 
voluntaristic, allegiance-based, concept of subjecthood remained tenable: 
membership of the British people, even if such membership entailed the 
franchise, was not inevitably to entail membership of the British state or 
body politic, and in stark contrast to Rousseau’s scheme of citizenship, 
need thus not be based upon philosophical/emotional concordance with the 
British state (or nation). Alternatively, with regard to the vast mass of 
British subject-citizens,142 inclusion within the British state was to be a 
matter of representation, rather than incorporation.
As an interesting aside, the dual-notion that Britons had irrevocably 
transferred their sovereign power to a supreme magistrate, and so were 
represented rather than incorporated within the British state, was to lead 
Maitland to describe the scheme of government within the United 
Kingdom with analogy to the common law instrument of the ‘trust.’14’ 
Whereas, in France the classical civil law notion of the corporation—or the 
joint holding of property—was to become the guiding principle of the 
modem state or republic, the British state seemed more closely to reflect *145
142 Excepting of course, the Lords Temporal and Spiritual (aristocracy and church), 
directly incorporated within the body politic.
145 E.W. Maitland, translation of, Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 




























































































the ancient common law trust, whereby the British people (beneficiaries) 
transferred formal possession of their power (property) to a supreme 
magistrate, who together with the Parliament (trustees), was to rule in the 
interests of the people (beneficiaries). Such an analogy again proves useful 
to this study, underlining the point that whilst the British had surrendered 
sovereign power to their rulers, such rulers were in a somewhat 
paternalistic construction, nonetheless required to exercise power with 
reference to the interests of the people: their greatest interest being 
identified as a natural or ‘residual’ liberty, which was to be best protected 
not through the positivisation of rights, but through the creation of ‘good’ 
forms of government (mixed government) and judicial oversight (rule of 
law), which would ‘naturally’ respect, and seek to preserve such liberty.
The notion of residual liberty, or the negative liberalism of the British 
constitution,144 145*however, raises further points of interest. Most clearly, since 
the rights of Britons were not to be positivised, the problem of the self- 
interested and individualistic citizen did not arise.I4‘ Equally, however, the 
area of residual liberty was to be a large one. In Blackstone’s analysis the 
curious detachment of the Briton from the state was also to have its flip 
side: though the Briton was not to be an integral part of the state, by the 
same token, he enjoyed an autonomous sphere ‘outside’ the state. In 
neither linking the Briton’s natural rights to a their positive legal 
expression, nor incorporating the Briton within the state, the individual 
Briton was to be given a status quite independent from the state—unlike 
the Frenchman, the Briton was not to be constituted by the state, and thus 
enjoyed an existence all of his own.141 To a certain degree reproducing 
Bacon’s reasoning in Calvin’s case, Blackstone demoted both the state and 
its law: it’s sole purpose was to create through relative rights the 
conditions in which the Briton might enjoy the natural rights given unto 
him by God—rights which no human authority might secure. In other 
words, the individual was free to do as he would, so long as he not infringe 
upon the relative rights which secured the absolute freedom of other 
Britons. Interestingly, the common law was likewise to be given a
144 A construction again expressive of the negative liberalism of the British constitution. 
For the stark difference between ‘negative’ British liberalism and more positive and 
individualistic notions of American liberalism, cf, J. Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in 
Political Philosophy, (Routledge: London 1989).
145 Paternalistic and representative government also furnishing a useful foil to self- 
interest.
144 Alternatively, if Frenchmen were constituted by positive rights secured by the French 




























































































particular status within this autonomous sphere. Not only was it 
legitimated since it was derived from the sovereign power of the supreme 
magistrate, but also since the Judges claimed a direct link with original 
authority of the people and natural justice. Accordingly, where the political 
community had yet to play its part in securing the relative rights and thus 
natural liberty of the Briton, the common law—with its dual legitimation— 
might mediate between Britons, enforcing their view of social justice, and 
establishing on a day to day basis, the relative rights necessary for the 
functioning of a civil society.
As a final aside, in refusing to elevate to rights of the individual Briton 
to the status of positive law which might be protected against the state. 
Blackstone explicitly relinquished certain earlier claims of the common 
law to be able to protect the rights of the individual against Parliament or 
the Sovereign.141 Probably a mere matter of political expediency in an age 
when Judges were hesitant to challenge the powers of a resurgent House of 
Commons, such a retreat was nonetheless to be compensated for by the 
establishment of a nascent liberal constitution through judicial 
independence and the primary role of the common law in policing the 
notion of the rule of law. This fact, however, necessarily begs a further 
question of why such a protean liberal constitution was never fully to 
mature and to bring with it a positive liberal view of the Briton. An 
answer, however, is to be found in an examination of a third moment in the 
evolution of the British Constitution which was to bring with it the sting in 
the tail of British constitutional history: the development of a specifically 
English and somewhat conservative form of legal positivism.
3. Dicey’s Law of the Constitution
Written over a series of eight editions published between 1885 and 
1926,147 48 Dicey’s Law of the Constitution was to have a profound effect both 
upon constitutional thinking and the scheme of government in the United 
Kingdom: being on the one hand, the first legal text to establish 
constitutional law as a distinct body of jurisprudence; and on the other, 
proving to be a statement of law so authoritative as to render its author the 
father of the modem British constitution. The Law of the Constitution thus 
remaining the main inspiration for British constitutional law to this day.
147 Most notably, Lord Cooke’s attempts to overturn an Act of Parliament in Bonham's 
Case.




























































































In the terms of this study, however, the apparently reforming and 
revolutionary Law of the Constitution becomes of vital interest in that its 
paradoxically conservative approach to the governing institutions of UK 
social and political life determined that the positivisation of the UK 
Constitution and British law would once again do little to remedy the 
incongruent status of the individual Briton; first, resisting contractarian 
government and placing (positive political) sovereignty in the hands of 
political institutions rather than the British people; and secondly, still 
rejecting any positive expression of individual liberty—relying instead 
upon a self-limiting political community to ensure the maintenance of a 
wide private sphere of non-statal personal autonomy.
3.1. Positivism, Utilitarianism, Pragmatic Liberalism and
Conservative Institutionalism
Dicey was to take up his constitutional pen in the late 19th Century. 
Accordingly, he was not simply to be influenced by momentous social and 
political events such as the Reform Acts, household suffrage, the growth of 
party politics. Catholic and Jewish emancipation, the demand for female 
suffrage, and the rise of chartism and the Labour Party. Rather he was also 
indelibly to be marked by the political philosophy of his time, and in 
particular by the as yet unresolved theoretical conflict between British 
utilitarianism, liberalism and collectivism.14" This interplay between radical 
socio-political forces and curiously incomplete philosophical advance, 
gives the key to Dicey’s work. On the one hand, responding pragmatically 
to the inexorable political demands of his age, Dicey was a positivist and 
radical reformer, who drew heavily upon the doctrines of utilitarianism, 
and so sought to expunge the British constitution of the relics of a pre­
political monarchical age: first, dispensing with Blackstone’s regal and 
intermediary ‘supreme magistrate’ and locating supreme sovereignty in the 
hands of the political community; and secondly, relinquishing the claim of 
the common law that it derive its authority either directly from the 
Monarch, or from higher natural principles. On the other hand, however, 
his was also a deeply conservative view of the British constitution. 
Although he shared much in common with J.S. Mill, and was thus a 
somewhat indivdualistic liberal at heart,'5" the political philosophy of his 
age had yet to supply Dicey with a convincing mechanism to overcome the
l4" J. Gray, op cit. n 17.
I5n See his eulogy of J.S. Mill (and to a lesser extent of the rationality of his utilitarian 




























































































collectivist tendencies of the utilitarianism from which Mill's liberal 
individualism had sprung;151 and accordingly, he was pragmatically to 
resort to deeply reactionary methods to lessen the danger that the sovereign 
British political community would infringe upon the liberty of the 
individual Briton.
Dicey accordingly becomes of interest to this study, not merely since he 
departed from certain of Blackstone’s prescriptions and so seemingly gave 
rise to a British political community resembling an illiberal polis, able 
autonomously to rule upon and to determine every facit of social and 
political life in Britain. But equally, since he remained unconvinced that 
entrenched individual rights were an appropriate or effective foil to 
unwarranted collectivist tendencies, and instead chose to retain certain of 
Blackstone’s institutional mechanisms to limit the powers of the political 
community. Once again, the protection of the residual liberty of the Briton, 
or Mill’s limited government, was not to be a matter of positive rights, 
with a constitutional judiciary explicitly weighing up collective against 
individual interest, but was instead pragmatically to be secured through an 
institutional conservatism which set severe limits upon the political 
community: the Briton was thus not be incorporated, but to be represented 
within a body politic, which was still to be predicated upon the 
preservation of privilege and the paternalistic weighing up of the national 
interest.
This harnessing of pragmatic liberalism with institutional conservatism, 
thus seems in the field of British citizenship to lead to the rather interesting 
conclusion that whilst post-Dicey. everything would seem to have 
changed—the shift had in fact been rather small. Ultimately, though 
seeming to differ radically from the traditionalist and naively 'romantic'
151 To engage very briefly in philosophical considerations, the difficulty in Mill’s 
individualistic liberalism be its resort to a utilitarian notion that that collective law be 
admissible only if it not do ‘harm’ to individuals, so creating an ‘absolute’ liberal 
value and denying the possibility that (in a somewhat Rawlsian construction) social 
justice might be secured through the on-going redefinition of rights through the 
weighing of collective and individual interest, J. Gray, op cit, n 17. Returning to 
Dicey, however, it is in fact unlikely that such theoretical consideration were the 
direct cause of his rejection of positive rights—after ail. the weakness in Mill was 
only later to become apparent—Rather his rejection of positivised individualism 
seemed to derive from the simple fact that he had looked at continental schemes of 
positivised rights and found them wanting in practice—see in particular his 




























































































Blackstone,15; representing instead the rational, radical and reforming 
forces of a ‘scientific age,’* 153455 Dicey’s achievement, if not necessarily his 
goal, was much the same as that of his predecessor: institutional atrophy 
and continuity in the status of the individual Briton.
3.2. Radical Utilitarianism: the Sovereign Political Community
To begin, however, with Dicean radicalism. Dicey’s faith in positivism, 
and the utilitarian creed that each and every exercise of sovereign power in 
the United Kingdom need be directly traceable to the will of the political 
community, and might no longer be derived from any pre-political 
monarchical dictate or higher natural authority, necessitated two crucial 
alterations to Blackstone’s constitutional scheme of government. A 
scientific age had seen the undisputed triumph of ‘politics,’ and 
accordingly, the interrelated notions that the people’s representative 
sovereignty resided in a regal ‘supreme magistrate,’ who had in turn 
delegated certain of his prerogatives directly to a judicial cadre needing no 
political legitimation, were to be identified as relics of a bygone age and 
consigned to the constitutional dustbin; the same fate seemingly being 
reserved for the claim that common law be a natural law, deploying 
precedent to enforce pre-existing principles with a ‘higher value’ than 
politically-determined law. No longer was a division to be made between 
the representative sovereignty of a monarch and the legislative sovereignty 
of a parliament. Rather, sovereign power within the United Kingdom was 
from now on exclusively and inexorably to be reserved to a Parliament,154 
from which the common law was also to derive its authority.
a) The Sovereign and Constitutive Parliament
Establishing the undisputed sovereignty of the Sovereign in Parliament, 
or creating a Parliament which ‘might do anything save turn a woman into 
a man,’1” Dicey sought to remedy Blackstone’s mythological perversion of
ls: Most particularly in relation to the myth of the Saxon polity, but also in relation to 
notion that justice in the UK sprang from the throne, ‘[N]o one, indeed, but a child 
believes that the King sits crowned on his throne at Westminster, and in his own 
person administers justice to his subjects,’ Law of the Constitution, op cil n 125
153 Ibid, lxii.
154 Presumably, the notion of the Crown was now to be understood as an administrative 
one, officers of the Crown merely administering the executive power of the 
Parliament.




























































































contractarian government, dismissing as fanciful the notion of a paction 
between a sagacious Saxon polity and their King. Wisely in age of rational 
politics and increasingly radical democracy, the idea that the British people 
had some nine centuries earlier irrevocably transferred their sovereign 
power to a benign Monarch who graciously shared his (representative) 
power with a Parliament, was one which was quickly to be dispensed with. 
Accordingly, the intermediary concept of the sovereign ‘supreme 
magistrate’ was to pass peacefully out of the British constitution.
Vitally, however, Dicey chose not to replace Blackstone’s contracting 
moment with one of his own. Rather than identify the time at, or the 
conditions under which, Britons had transferred their power to the British 
state, he merely shifted the existing location of sovereignty, placing it 
firmly in the hands of the Sovereign in Parliament. Such a move was to 
have two vital consequences: the first, the creation of a constitutive as well 
as legislative parliament; the second, the politicisation of law, or the 
determination that all authority in Britain derive from political processes 
and the political community.
To begin, however, with the constitutive parliament. As Tocqueville was 
to note, in the absence of Saxon paction, the failure to place either popular 
or constitutional restrictions upon the sovereign power of the Parliament, 
made that Parliament ‘both a legislative and constitutive assembly.’156 157
Dicey was to confirm this description, identifying it as:
a convenient formula for summing up the fact that Parliament can change any law 
whatever. Being a legislative assembly it can make ordinary laws, being a 
constituent assembly it can make laws which shift the basis of the constitution.151
In other words, Dicey had knowingly created a legislative despot which 
might if it wished overturn individual rights, restrict civil liberties or 
simply ‘condition and subvert society to its own ends.’158 Such a 
construction would thus seem logically to conflict with his passionate 
adherence to individualism. However, it was nonetheless to form the vital 
plank in his mission to rationalise the British constitution, since through it 
he was to positive and politicise all acts of law-making and to ensure that 
all authority in the United Kingdom be directly traceable to the will of the 
political community: if there be but one sovereign power in the UK, and 
that be Parliament, then any legitimate exercise of state power, be it by 
policeman, state official or Judge, be an expression not of any higher or
156 Law of the Constitution, op cit, n 125, at 84.
157 Ibid.




























































































natural principles, or of regal whim, but of the will of the political 
community. In short: the final confirmation of the utilitarian creed that all 
law be man-made and need be politically legitimated.
b) The Rationalisation of the Common Law
Clearly, Dicey’s mission likewise necessitated a radical reformulation of 
the claim of the common law to legitimacy. The common law, still 
vigorous and active outside the sphere of parliamentary legislation, 
remained the nemesis of the utilitarians: Bentham dismissing it as a 'sham 
law’ and a ‘thing purely imaginary.’15’ Dicey’s attempts to enclose it within 
his positivistic and politicised scheme of government, however, were two 
pronged: being based first, on the debunking of the notion that common 
law be a higher and perfect natural law, preserved through precedent; and 
secondly, upon the prosaic argument that since the Judicature Acts of 
1873, its jurisdiction and thus political legitimacy had been confirmed by 
Parliament.
The relinquishing of the claim of the common law to be a natural law 
was once again an astute response to the scepticism of a time of science 
and reason. It was similarly a painful act for a professional body which had 
long worshipped naturalistic heroes such as Bacon and Coke. Dicey 
nonetheless made the transition less painful, arguing that whilst Lord 
Coke’s appeals to natural principles and precedent in his battles with 
Monarch and Parliament had been based on ‘pedantic,’ ‘artificial’ and 
‘unhistorical’ reasoning, ‘the obstinacies and fallacies of the Lord Chief 
Justice’ had nonetheless entailed an act ‘of great statesmanship,’ securing 
liberty and the constitution at a time of crisis.* 160 Natural law promulgated 
through the ‘fiction’ of precedent was simply a means whereby ‘judicial 
decision conceals its transformation into judicial legislation,’161 and thus 
might claim no legitimacy in age of positive law. Nonetheless, its political 
and constitutional worth in preserving liberty had oft been proven, and 
such gallant legal activities had now been recognised and retrospectively 
legitimated by the parliamentary determination of the jurisdiction of the 
common law. Alternatively, whilst the Courts no longer directly disposed 
of the monarchical prerogative, insofar as their endeavours were tolerated 
and confirmed by the Parliament, they had now been firmly drawn within 
the sphere of politically legitimated law.
Supra, n 57.





























































































3.3. Institutional Conservatism and Dicey’s Rule of Law
Dicey’s achievement in positivising and politicising the British 
constitution and scheme of law and Government in the United Kingdom 
might not be underestimated. British constitutional writing had long- 
suffered from a remedial romanticism which had obscured the simple fact 
that much of the supposed constitution was logically inconsistent, 
theoretically untenable and subversive of ‘legitimate’ political power."’2 In 
Dicey’s own words, any ardent student of constitutional law and history 
would thus find himself:
in a sort of maze in which the wanderer is perplexed by unreality, by 
antiquarianism, and by conventionalism.162 *465
Even the great Blackstone had succumbed to such mysticism, and 
through the ‘unrealities of his language,’161 had masked simple facts of law 
and the failings in the constitution, and had so contributed to the curious 
complacency of an English constitutionalism which allowed George III to 
encapsulate the views of constitutional writers such as Hallam and Burke, 
in one simple phrase: ‘it [sic. the constitution] was the most perfect of 
human formations.’16' Alternatively, in Dicey’s summary:
it was to them not a mere polity to be compared with the government of any other 
state, but so to speak a sacred mystery of statesmanship; it had (as we have all 
heard from our youth up) not been made but had grown; it was the fruit not of 
abstract theory but of that instinct which ... has enabled Englishmen ... to build up 
sound and lasting institutions, much as bees construct a honeycomb, without 
undergoing the degradation of understanding the principles on which they raise a 
fabric more subtly wrought than any conscious work of a r t... ; no definite body of 
persons could claim to be its creators, no one could point to the document which 
contained its clauses; it was in short a thing by itself, which Englishmen and 
foreigners alike should venerate where they are not presently able to 
comprehend.166
Mysticism, however, was not a trap into which Dicey would fall. 
Instead, in an age of reason and science he would reject ‘legal formalism,’ 
or the claims of lawyers that they be establishing government or the
162 Dicey’s first concern in the Law of the Constitution, thus being the debunking of all 
historical, and legal mythologies of the constitution, op cit, n 125, ‘The True Nature 
































































































constitution in accordance with a mythological scheme of pre-existing 
‘natural’ principles; would circumvent ‘antiquarian’ mysticism; would 
explicitly refuse directly to discuss or judge political constitutional 
theory;167 and would so peel away all romantic pretence and reduce 
constitutional law to a simple matter of the ‘rules which directly or 
indirectly affect the distribution of the exercise of the sovereign power in 
the state.’168 The sole ‘duty ... of an English professor of law’ was the 
pragmatic task:
to state what are the laws which form part of the constitution, to arrange them in
their order, to explain their meaning, and to exhibit where possible their logical
connection.169
Expunging from his work, the laboured philosophy and unconvincing 
mythology which characterised so much of the Commentaries, Dicey 
positivised and rationalised the constitution. Existing constitutional 
arrangements were simply schematically to be identified, enumerated and 
laid down. In rationalising and positivising, however, he also chose to 
describe constitutional law in such a manner as to effect the vital shift in 
sovereignty which would appear to determine that all law and authority in 
the United Kingdom now be politically legitimated. The least complacent 
of constitutional thinkers, Dicey recognised that his radical age would no 
longer tolerate vague and unconvincing justifications for the exercise of 
authority, and so reformulated and presented the ‘facts’ of the constitution 
in a manner acceptable to the increasingly powerful political community.
Given such radicalism, the claim that Dicey had done little to alter the 
constitutional status of the individual Briton, may initially appear to be 
surprising. However, support for such an argument might immediately be 
found in Dicey’s positivistic claim to be merely enumerating the existing 
laws of the constitution.170 In other, words, there is in Dicey an inherent 
degree of constitutional continuity. His rationalisation did not entail the 
demolition and reconstruction of the British state and government. Instead, 
whilst he was to make some fundamental alterations to underlying 
constitutional philosophy, shifting power between ‘constitutional’ 
institutions, he was nevertheless to leave such institutions intact. Equally,
167 ‘I Find these matters too high for me,’ Law o f the Constitution, op cit, n 125, at 20.
168 Ibid, at 22.
169 Ibid, at 31.
170 Alternatively, Blackstone was incorrect and Dicey was right, not since the 
constitution had meanwhile undergone massive institutional change, but since 




























































































however, the simple fact that he was able to deploy positivistic reasoning 
to allow for the inclusion of utilitarian notions of parliamentary 
sovereignty within existing constitutional arrangements, at once 
demonstrates that he shared Blackstone’s notable ability to present law in a 
manner reflective of his own philosophical convictions.171 Accordingly, it 
may be argued that in order to satisfy his own liberal desire to limit the 
powers of the political community, he was to confirm various of 
Blackstone’s constitutional institutions and mechanisms, and so was to 
leave the status of the individual Briton, and the relationship between the 
Briton and the British state, much as it had been. Vitally, however, the 
same may be said for the Dicean concept of the rule of law. Dicey's 
continued reliance upon a rule of law, policed by the common law, as a 
mediating tool between the exercise of state power and individual rights, 
and his explicit concern that such a rule of law be being placed under 
pressure by the increase in interventionist government, likewise betrays his 
overwhelming preference for limited or residual government.'77 In other 
words, Dicey too, may be argued to have viewed the Briton as being 
somehow independent from the state, enjoying a large sphere of 
autonomous action; a private area in which the common law was de facto 
substantively to regulate social and economic relations.
a) The Limits to the Political Community
Although committed to liberal principles of individual liberty, Dicey 
was far from being a radical democrat. Parting company with J.S. Mill, he 
was deeply distrustful of demands for an increase in the extent of the 
franchise. Tracing such politically universalist sentiments to the 
unfortunate decline in support for utilitarianism’s rational notion of 
individualism, and a ‘popular error’ which had seen a resurgence in 
‘doctrines of natural rights,’ he dismissed demands for direct and 
immediate political participation—inexplicable in a ‘scientific age’—as 
being no more than a manifestation of a ‘superstitious’ faith in ‘the maxim 
vox popoli vox Dei.’l73 His disdain for political universalism, best 
demonstrated by his censure of Mill’s advocacy for the ill-advised cause of *175
171 Cf, to Blackstone’s legal-philosophical adeptness, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Blackstone’s 
Commentaries,’ loc cit, n 97.





























































































female suffrage,174 was happily nonetheless to leave no lasting impression 
upon the breadth of political citizenship in the United Kingdom.'75 
Crucially, however, the reasons underlying his distrust for forms of radical 
democracy, and his more subtle constitutional mechanisms for the control 
of the political community, were indelibly to mark the British constitution, 
and thus continue to determine the status of the individual Briton, and the 
relationship of Britons with the British state, to this day.
Taken together with his ardent belief in individualism, Dicey’s 
deployment of rational utilitarianism to update and de-mythologise the 
British constitution, presented him with a central difficulty: potentially, 
Austin’s sovereign political community was an unfettered despot, able to 
determine every facet of social and economic life in Britain, and even to 
disrupt the liberal sphere of personal autonomy.176 Theoretically, 
mechanisms such as the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ limits to sovereignty 
might aid in reducing such a danger: the internal limits being the sovereign 
political community’s sensible desire to refrain from acts it could not 
successfully carry through;177 the external limits being its regard for public 
opinion, or its desire not to offend the tolerance of the public (electors).178 *
Vitally, however, such theoretical restrictions on the sovereign power did 
not of themselves seem to be an adequate brake upon the growing 
collectivist, and even ‘socialistic’ tendencies of the 19th Century British 
polity17”
In explanation: though undoubtedly rational, utilitarianism’s primary 
tenet that law be legitimated by its attempts to increase the welfare of as 
many man as possible, determined that it also contain the seeds of a 
collectivism, not only hazardous to individual liberty but even promoting
174 Women were seemingly to be denied the vote for the simple reason that there were 
inescapable 'differences of biology’ between men and women, Ibid, lxix.
175 Female suffrage being effected by the Representation of the Peoples Act 1919. As an 
interesting aside A.J.P. Taylor argues that the enfranchisement of women in the 
United Kingdom owed little to the eventual triumph of liberal and natural 
philosophies which saw all men (ie, including women) as being inherently equal, and 
thus worthy of equal political voice. But was instead no more than a mere reward for 
industrial and social services rendered during WWI, English History 1914-1945, 
(OUP: Oxford. 1965).
176 A failing recognised by Austin himself, reported by Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 
op fit, n 125, 37, el seq.
177 Presumably, such as tum a man into a women.
178 Law of the Constitution, op cit. n 125, at 37 et seq.




























































































of ‘socialistic’ leanings.180 The risk that a notion of aggregate, or common, 
welfare might no longer be construed as simply meaning the common 
pursuit of the liberty of individuals,181 * and would instead take on a 
collectivist hue, had in Dicey’s view become a very tangible one. The 
Edwardian Sovereign Parliament thus seemed dangerously close to 
disturbing the central principle that political intervention should serve 
‘nothing but the defence of individual liberty,’181 and had indeed already 
embarked upon an ambitious programme to secure collective welfare 
goals; a programme comprising Factory Acts, Public Health Acts. Working 
Class Housing Acts, and most notable of all, Asquith's social insurance 
programmes.185 186
Dicey’s warnings about the dangers of the short-term pursuit of 
seductive collectivist welfare above the long term-pursuit of the common 
good through the preservation of individual liberty, were explicit:
The beneficial effect of State intervention, especially in the form of legislation is 
direct and immediate, and so to speak, visible, whilst its evil effects are gradual 
and indirect, and lie out of sight.184
Vitally, Dicey was no mere supporter of laissez-faire economics, and 
based his argument that collectivism might be destructive of common 
welfare, upon far more than the mere political consideration that should a 
British government overly regulate shipping, ‘few ships will set out on 
their voyage.’185 Instead, overeager collectivism was identified as being a 
sure danger to the most fundamental of British rights and liberties, 
including contractual freedom, and was thus deemed to be disruptive of all 
common welfare. The interventionist legislator who did ‘not believe in the 
wisdom of leaving each man to settle his own affairs for himself,’'8" should 
not forget that he be undermining the very civic rights which had given 
birth to the post-feudal and autonomous Briton, and thus to the notion of
180 Ibid, Dicey recognising British socialism’s debt to English utilitarianism, ‘Modem 
socialism inherits from Benthamism.’ 303-310.
181 Ibid, as Dicey claimed it had been in the time of Benthamite ‘individualistic’ 
utilitarianism.
,8: Ibid, 261.
188 Legislation running from the mid-19th Century to 1911.






























































































political community itself: ‘[Collectivism curtails as surely as
individualism extends the area of contractual freedom.’187
The stakes were high indeed, individual freedom was under immediate 
threat, and accordingly the need for mechanisms to limit the extent of 
nascent political collectivism was an imperative one. However, the most 
obvious of such mechanisms,—or at least, the most obvious to a modem 
mind—the constitutional incorporation of the state, and the subjection of 
the sovereign power, or political collective, to the limitations of higher 
individual rights, was to Dicey no more than a dangerous illusion: he had 
studied the results of the French Revolution and he did not like them. The 
‘unlimited scorn entertained by every Benthamite for the social contract 
and for natural rights’ had undoubtedly been a ‘guarantee against sympathy 
with Jacobinical principles.’188 However, as even Dicey was to recognise’:
it had deprived individual liberty of one of its safeguards. For the doctrine of 
innate rights, logically unsound though it may be, places in theory a limit upon the 
despotism of the majority.189
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom should be grateful that is had been so 
deprived, since such rights were in essence ‘a very feeble barrier against 
the inroads of popular tyranny,’190 and were thus fostering of a dangerous 
complacency. Written rights could not of themselves secure liberty:
the Declaration of the Rights of Man did not save from death one among the 
thousands of innocent citizens dragged before the Revolutionary Tribunal; the 
American Declaration of Independence, with its proclamation of the inalienable 
rights of man, did not deliver a single negro from slavery.191 *
Resisting the temptation to ascribe Dicey’s dislike of innate rights to his 
fear that theories of natural right would lead to a universal political




191 Ibid. Though Dicey fairly recognised the effects of such documents upon public
opinion in France and the States: 'The have assuredly affected public opinion. In
France the declaration of the Rights of man has kept alive the conviction that a 
National legislature ought not to possess unlimited authority. Some articles in the 
Constitution of the United States inspired by the sentiment of the Declaration of 
Independence, have supported individual freedom; one of them has gone so far to 
make the faith that the obligation of contracts is sacred, a part of the public morality 





























































































community and so merely accentuate the problem of collectivism."* it 
might thus be argued that he chose to reject constitutional incorporation 
and higher rights as a means to control the political collective, for a far 
more altruistic reason: he simply felt that normative limits to sovereign 
power were not of themselves effective, and that more practical political 
constitutional mechanism would be a better guarantee of the individual 
Briton’s liberty.
Hence, the assertion that Dicey chose to promulgate a pragmatic form of 
liberalism,1,3 or a strategy designed to curtail the dangers posed by 
collectivism, through institutional conservatism, or the retention of certain 
of Blackstone’s prescriptions for ‘good,’ or limited, government.
Reviewing the Law of the Constitution from this perspective it thus at 
once becomes apparent that in refusing to incorporate the individual Briton 
within the British body politic; rigidly rejecting proportional and instead 
supporting district-based representation194; confirming that the House of 
Lord’s rejection of various Common’s proposals, had ‘protected the 
authority of the nation’195 196; and applauding the rationality of Members of 
Parliament who did not merely reflect the views of their constituents""’; 
Dicey had returned to Blackstone’s scheme of distancing the individual 
Briton from the business of politics, and instead providing that he be 
represented within a paternalistic body politic which would wisely 
legislate in the interests of the national community. The legislature would 
form the opinions of Britons and not vice versa. 197 Even the most radical of 
utilitarians should admit of the pragmatic philosophy that were there was 
doubt ‘whether the citizens of a given country were sufficiently 
enlightened to understand their own interests,’ ‘the rule of an intelligent 
despot or of an intelligent minority’ was to be preferred above the rule of
1,2 A temptation nonetheless somewhat justified in view of his statement that the 
doctrine of natural rights be a superstitious popular error, supra.
195 Though of course, in view of his apparent dislike of natural rights it may be doubted 
that he be a liberal at all. Nonetheless, the pragmatic epithet liberal, rather than 
individualistic utilitarian is more appropriate for Dicey, since he was to preach the 
creed of civic (if not political) equality, through his continued support for 
Blackstone’s rule of law, infra.
1.4 Law o f the Constitution, op cit, n 125, lxv, el seq
1.5 Ibid, xxi.
196 Somewhat ironically, with specific mention of J.S. Mill’s support for female 
suffrage, Ibid, lxv.




























































































an unintelligent majority.’'98 Alternatively, government be a matter of 
sagacity, with the measure of the wisdom of ‘good’ government being its 
ability, through the ‘reason’ of the sagacious men gathered together within 
the body politic, to distinguish between measures conducive to individual 
liberty and those merely productive of short-term collective welfare, and so 
to pursue true rather than illusionary common welfare.'99
b) Dicey's Rule of Law
Finally, attention need be focused upon Dicey’s notion of the rule of 
law. First, Dicey’s pivotal confirmation that rights in the United Kingdom 
be secured by ‘the ordinary courts of the land’198 200; secondly, his assertion 
that;
[I]n England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes 
to one law administered by the ordinary Courts has been pushed to its utmost 
limit201;
and thirdly, his famous residual formulation of personal liberty as 
meaning
in substance a person’s right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other 
physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal justification202;
all confirm that Dicey adhered to Blackstone’s view of the rule of law as 
a mediating notion between rights and power.203 Policed by the common 
law courts, the rule of law continued to determine that should an act not be 
traceable to the sovereign power, it would be classed as a private action 
and therefore be subject to the sanctions of the Judges.
In other words, for all of his disdain for the natural principles and the 
‘artificial,’ ‘unhistorical’ and ‘fallacious’ reasoning of the common law, 
Dicey was happy to confirm the principles of right and justice it had
198 Ibid.
199 It is, however, important to note here that in all fairness, Dicey did not regard 
instruments such as Trade Unions as being destructive of common welfare—rather a 
wise Parliament had allowed the common man to collectivise his political interests in 
such a manner that is not be destructive of public liberty. Law and Opinion in 
England, op cit, n 179.
200 Ibid, at 203.
201 Ibid, at 189.
202 Ibid. 20-204.





























































































historically established, and to entrust to it the pivotal task of balancing 
relations between the state and individual Britons, as well as between 
individual Britons themselves. This, however, raises two final points of 
interest: the first, being the possibility that Dicey still envisaged of a very 
wide role for the common law, with the Courts playing a major part in 
regulating relations between Britons outside the sphere of governmental 
intervention; and the second, being the large question mark hanging over 
Dicey’s assertion that the common law no longer rely on natural or 
customary principles for its legitimation.
To begin, however, with the particular—private—role of the common 
law in Dicey’s scheme of government in Britain. Dicey’s view that state 
intervention need be restricted to the preservation of liberty, seems to be a 
modem confirmation of Bacon and Blackstone’s earlier devaluation in the 
role of the state and its law: it was there merely to preserve man’s liberty 
through the maintenance of social order. The flip side of this construction, 
however, being the fact that the individual Briton was thus to be afforded a 
large sphere of personal autonomy in which he might determine his own 
social and economic relationship. Although the ‘wise’ state be unwelcome 
in this sphere, the common law, however, was not: it, through the rule of 
law, would seek to ensure that the individual Briton remain civil amongst 
themselves and not infringe upon each cither’s liberties.
This of course, raises the interesting question of whether it be 
convincing to claim that in this, its essentially private role, the common 
law was politically legitimated. Certainly, in that Parliament had set the 
limits to its jurisdiction, it might claim some form of formal legitimacy and 
connection to the sovereign political power. However, in that it was daily 
formulating new principles and responding to the pragmatic need of 
society for new solutions to new problems, might this substantive process 
of law-making be said to have any on-going political legitimation? 
However, rather than directly tackle this point—and the weaknesses in 
Dicey’s reasoning—here mention will only be made of the fact that 
common lawyers themselves appeared to have taken lesser note of the need 
to rationalise their law, and continued, and continue to this day, to claim a 
non-political legitimacy for the substance of their law-making: whilst 
natural principles are less often called upon,2" precedent, or the claim that 
the law be using strictly rational methods to preserve and perfect, through 204
204 Though still forming the basis for equitable law. An example being the natural 




























































































rational reasoning, the customary law of British society, still plays a vital 
role in common law thinking.10'
3.4. Conclusion
Dicey’s Law of the Constitution, readily supplies the answer to the 
question of why Blackstone’s nascent liberal constitution was never to 
evolve into a full-blown liberal construction, encompassing positive 
individual rights which would supply an explicitly normative forum for the 
balancing of collective and individual interests. Such an answer, however, 
does not derive from the fact that by virtue of his disdain for notions of 
inherent or natural rights, Dicey’s liberal credentials might indeed be 
doubted. Rather, his assertion of the absolute civic equality of the Briton 
under the rule of law, confirms that Dicey’s was indeed the liberal pre­
occupation with the balancing of individual right against social or 
collective welfare. Dicean constitutional atrophy, instead derives from his 
preference for the protection of individual rights through pragmatic 
political restrictions upon the extent of the sovereignty of the political 
community. Good government, prepared to restrict itself to securing 
individual liberty, would serve the individualist liberal cause better than 
positive rights. Reasoning and reasonable men would be best placed to 
determine which measures of collectivist welfare were damaging to 
individual liberty and which were not. Accordingly, Blackstone’s ready 
made constitutional mechansims to restrict the body politic to wise men, 
were to be revived and confirmed. The potential folly of a sovereign 
legislature was to guarded against by the careful restriction of the polity to 
the aristocratic House of Lords and the representative House of Commons.
All this of course determined that the position of the individual Briton 
was not to change greatly. Though Dicey had presumed to serve the cause 
of utilitarianism, he had ultimately perverted it, refusing to admit of its 
logical conclusion: radical democracy.;o° The Briton was not to be 
incorporated within the British state. Instead, he was to remain 
autonomous from it, being represented rather than included within the 
polity. Equally, however, he was also to enjoy a large sphere of 105
105 A.W.B. Simpson, ‘The Common Law and legal Theory,’ in ibidem, Legal Theory 
and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law, (The Hambledon Press: London, 
1987). Equally, however. Dicey clearly failed to convince political thinkers of the 
political legitimacy of the common: see the scepticism of Laski, Parliamentary 
Government in England, op cit. n 68.




























































































autonomous action; a private area which, for all Dicey’s protestations to 
the contrary, was still to be regulated by the substantive and precedent- 
based jurisprudence of the common law.
Finally, in the matter of who might be a Briton, Calvin's case, and to the 
extent that the common law still continued to reason through precedent, its 
underlying natural principles, was determinative. The regulation of 
Britishness through a hierarchical and pre-political notion of monarchical 
allegiance was thus to remain tenable in a modem British age. Nationality 
law need contain no element of voluntarism since inclusion within the 
British people still did not necessarily entail inclusion within the British 
polity.
C. Conclusion: Rousseau Rejected
The examination of the philosophical thought which was to find its way 
into constitutional thinking, and so was to determine the position of the 
individual Briton and to govern relations between Briton and British State, 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the United Kingdom had rejected 
almost every one of Rousseau’s philosophical prescriptions for the 
Citoyen. Leaving aside the possible connection between the natural law 
principles which secured Calvin’s status as subject and those which led 
French revolutionaries to wrestle power from a despotic monarchy, the 
story is one of divergence. Britons existed by simply virtue of organicism, 
and were not created through a voluntaristic act. The Briton was not to be 
incorporated, but was simply to be represented within the British body 
politic or state. Equally, however, the Briton was never to be viewed as 
being synonymous with the state, but was instead to enjoy an existence 
autonomous from it. Similarly, neither was the Briton to be protected by 
positive rights, nor might he claim to have politically influenced all the 
laws under which he lived. Rather, the protection of his liberty was to be 
based on a curious concordance between a natural and customary common 
law and a self-restraining political community. Finally, the natural enemy 
of the French citizen, the aristocrat was alive and well within the British 
polity, not only in the character of hereditary peers, but also in that of the 
life peers and parliamentary representatives, chosen (or at least supposed 
to be chosen) by virtue of their imputed characteristics of wisdom and 
reasonableness.
As a final note, however, this was the ancien polity upon which the 
radical Labour government of 1945 was to attempt to graft its new notion 




























































































party was thus to pursue its goal of social and substantive inclusion 
through the structure of a sovereign, paternalistic yet potentially despotic 
Parliament. By the same measure, the balancing of its collectivist 
programme of social welfare against individual rights, was not to take 
place in the courts by means of the on-going definition of neutral 
normative rights, but was instead to become a matter of party politics in the 
House of Commons, and ultimately a brute struggle between classes and 
ideologies. This, however, leads to the second theme to be tackled by this 
study: the inherent instability of the constitutional moment of 1945, and 
the ultimate demise in industrial citizenship.
III. Industrial Citizenship: The Unstable Constitutional 
Moment
As noted, 1945 and the immediate post-war years might fairly be argued 
to represent a ‘constitutional moment’ in British history. The landslide 
electoral victory of a radical and reforming Labour Government, an 
overwhelming political commitment to a notion of joint (national) 
ownership of wealth, the pursuit—by both successive Conservative and 
Labour administrations—of nationalisation programmes, the establishment 
of universal health, welfare and educational provision: all constituted the 
explicit creation of a ‘Welfare State’ which was to bring with it its own 
corollary notion of ‘industrial’ or ‘welfare’ citizenship, and was thus to 
seem at last to represent the refashioning of the British state and polity 
along openly egalitarian lines.
Crucially for the purposes of this study, however, this restructuring of 
British society and the materialisation of the institutions of British 
governance was very much a political rather than formal 
legal/constitutional occurrence. To be sure, the radical re-alignment in 
notions of social structuring and government which saw Britons enveloped 
in a welfare cocoon from ‘cradle to grave,’ was accompanied both by a 
vast increase in legislative and administrative activity20’ and a concomitant 
acceptance by the common law (and Scottish law) of various substantive 20
202 Determining that UK political and legal debate would likewise be marked by the 
same concerns about the democratic accountability of and respect for personal rights 
exhibited by a top-heavy administrative state, which were characteristic of the history 
of most post-war western countries, cf, P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the 




























































































principles of social justice.208 However, the British polity's seemingly 
overwhelming preference for the pragmatic political pursuit of notions of 
joint wealth ‘ownership’ above a normative commitment to the pursuit of 
wealth ‘distribution’ via concretised (higher) social rights or the 
constitutional formalisation of the Sozialstaat, proved to be 
determinative;209 dictating that British social renewal was to be less a 
matter of constitutional upheaval—or a fundamental re-appraisal of the 
philosophical/normative foundations of the British State and Citizenry— 
and more one of the political pursuit by the Sovereign Parliament of 
various social, and on occasions simply expedient, policy goals.
This emphasis upon the predominance of politics and the political 
community within the post-war UK constitutional moment thus furnishes 
the key to this second section upon the modem status of the individual 
Briton, or the post-war ‘deep’ concept of UK citizenship. First, on a 
somewhat negative note and in the absence of constitutional upheaval— 
and/or constitutional thinkers to rival Dicey—the formal constitutional 
relationship maintained between Briton and British State would perversely 
appear to have altered little: the most telling manifestation of this 
constitutional atrophy being a radical reworking of British nationality and 
race relations law which, though by-and-large maintaining a universalist 
basis for belonging, nonetheless showed little or no regard for modern 
concepts of contractual voluntarism or the positively constituted state and 
(rights-bearing) individual (III.A). Secondly, though somewhat more 
speculatively, a constitutional moment founded not on secured normative 
pillars but rather upon highly contingent political processes, would also 
appear to have been inherently unstable: the lamentably precipitous decline 
of industrial citizenship being highlighted during a brief discussion of the 
pluralist critique of the collectivist foundations of the UK Welfare State 
(III.B). And thirdly, in a far more positive mood, its idiosyncrasies and 
faults notwithstanding, the post-war ‘deep’ concept of UK citizenship 
would nevertheless appear to offer some positive lessons in the matter of 
current attempts to evolve new notions of citizenship suited both to a post-
208 Though once again, in comparison with many of its continental counterparts, the 
private law of the UK was somewhat of a ‘materialisation laggard’—an example here 
being the relatively late acceptance of principles of consumer protection in 
contractual law (UCTA dating only from 1977).
209 Marking the essential difference between the British Welfare State and Scandinavian 
or continental welfare models, cf, G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare 




























































































statal world. The notion of UK citizenship thus appears to offer a ‘non- 
statal’ blueprint for citizenship of the European Union.
A. Nationality, Race and Constitutional Atrophy
Though not a product of the transition to a Welfare State, and instead a 
simple result of the UK’s declining colonial role abroad and a corollary 
demand for the regulation of troubled race relations at home, the history of 
the reform of nationality law and the evolution of a comprehensive legal 
framework for the suppression of racism, is nonetheless indicative of the 
general post-war trend which saw major social upheavals effected without 
prejudice to the underlying normative foundations of the UK Constitution. 
Just as the inherent social inequality of the Briton210 was not to be tackled 
through an inspirational call to higher and ‘equalising’ civic and social 
rights and was instead to be secured through the prosaic efforts of 
commonly-owned redistributive institutions such as the nationalised 
industries and Health Service. So too, were the foundations of British 
nationality to be overhauled via political edict rather than the re­
constituting of the British state. Meanwhile ‘good’ race relations were not 
to be a momentous matter of a constitutional commitment to equality, but 
were instead a simple issue of the strengthening of the rule of law within a 
private sphere of social interaction in order to combat discrimination on 
the basis of ‘race, nationality or ethnic origins.’* 2"
Generally seen as being intimately intertwined2'2—nationality law almost 
exclusively being used as an immigration policy instrument to regulate the 
number of entrants into the UK: with the Race Relations Act2'3 likewise 
seeking to ensure that immigration not result in social upheaval— 
nationality and race legislation thus exemplifies two defining trends in 
post-war UK thinking upon the state and relationship of the individual to 
the state. First, in the matter of the definition of ‘Britishness,’ the 
continuing refusal either to constitute the British state or to allow the 
British people a formally voluntaristic status within the state. And 
secondly, with regard to immigration and social control, the harnessing of 
and residual reliance upon the traditional UK and dual governing
210 And remember this was a social inequality upon which Blackstone’s constitution was 
normatively built, infra, II.B.2.la).






























































































instruments of paternalistic political leadership and a wide-ranging—and 
civic—sphere of purely ‘private’ interaction governed by the 'rule of law.'
1. Nationality: A New Status for New Britons?
While arguably the most fundamental post-war upheaval in British 
law—though characteristically afforded little or no public attention214 215—the 
1948 Nationality Act which brought to an end the common law’s ancient 
role in defining ‘Britishness,’ was not a result of a positive desire for legal 
reform and was instead forced upon a reluctant UK Government by the 
self-governing dominions of the British Commonwealth115. As noted by the 
Lord Chancellor when introducing the 1948 Act which replaced the 
doctrine of allegiance with a statutory definition of citizenship:
The Dominions are insisting that we shall not take a different position from them. 
They create their citizens.216
As such, the Act is characteristic of each of the three post war reforms in 
nationality legislation: all being an immediate response to pressing and 
particular political problems of decolonialisation and immigration.
Alternatively, the 1948 scheme whereby a new definition of Britishness 
would rest upon a concordance of legislative action by member states of 
the Commonwealth, was an answer to the increasing independence of 
formerly dependent states such as Canada and Australia and their desire 
both to ‘create’ their own citizens, and to have free rein over their 
immigration policies.217 Accordingly, the new dual scheme of 
Commonwealth citizenship and United Kingdom and Colonies citizenship 
would replace the once common—to the dominions and colonies—legal 
category of British subjecthood;218 so ending the situation whereby all
214 As noted in Parliament: ‘The country is almost unaware of the existence of this Bill 
and certainly totally unaware of its profound significance,’ Lord Altrincham, Hansard 
[House of Lords, 21 June 1948], at 1000.
215 Cf, A. Dummet/A. Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others, op cit, n 71, chapter 
7.
216 Hansard [House of Lords, Vol. 55], at 748.
217 An element of racism undoubtedly creeping in here: Canada, South Africa and 
Australia (or the ‘white’ dominions) having sought to restrict immigration from India 
since the beginning of the Century, cf, A. Dummet/A. Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, 
Aliens and Others, op cit, n 71.
218 Though reborn in a new form, both UK and colonies citizens and commonwealth 
citizens becoming British Subjects (or, in alternative terminology, ‘citizens of the 





























































































individuals bom within the British Empire and Commonwealth might 
move freely from one dominion/colony to another.21’ Similarly, however, 
the 1971 Immigration Act which introduced the now happily defunct 
notion of ‘patrial’ citizenship—to which an immediate right of abode in the 
UK would attach—seemed likewise to represent the response of a Labour 
government to calls for a limitation upon the supposedly ‘large-scale’ 
immigration of citizens from the remaining UK colonies into the United 
Kingdom:* 220 restricting the entry of UK colony citizens to those with a 
parent (and in some limited cases a grandparent) bom in the UK. Equally, 
the 1981 British Nationality Act seemed to be a further variant upon this 
theme of pragmatic immigration control: the Conservative administration’s 
extraordinary five-fold scheme of British citizenship,221 British dependent 
territories citizenship,222 British overseas citizenship,22' British protected 
person,224 and British subjects without citizenship,225 again being a less than 
subtle instrument of immigration control—at last severing the Gordian 
knot with the remaining colonies, and endowing only the first group of 
‘British citizens’ with an automatic right of entry into the UK.
Clearly, at one purely factual level, the post-war reform of UK 
nationality legislation was largely representative of a general political
210 Cf, J. Mervyn Jones. British Nationality Law, (OUP: Oxford 1956) at 81-85. 
Commonwealth citizens being those persons afforded citizenship under the 
independent law-making competences of the dominions and southern Rhodesia. 
United Kingdom and Colony citizens being citizens of the UK and colonies on the 
basis of birth there, birth outside the territories to a father bom or naturalised there, or 
naturalisation on the discretion of the Home Secretary (sections 4, 5, 10 BNA 1948).
220 A. Favel, ‘Philosophies of Integration,’ op cit, n 7.
221 Being those bom in the UK to parents (British or otherwise) legally settled in the UK, 
or those bom outside the UK with a parent bom in the UK under the former 
conditions.
222 Being those persons attached (in the sense that British citizens proper are attached to 
Britain) to the remaining colonies (ie, Gibraltar).
22' Being citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies, who did not acquire British 
citizenship or British dependent territories citizenship when the 1981 Act came into 
force.
224 Order in Council under section 38 BNA 1981, being persons connected with 
territories which were protectorates, protected states of United Kingdom trust 
territories. Such persons have the right to a British passport and to naturalisation by 
registration.
225 Being British subjects under the 1948 BNA who failed to acquire any other 
citizenship when the country they were living in adopted new nationality laws. Such 




























































































adjustment to the piecemeal decline of the British Empire. In other words, 
in a post-colonial world, the common law doctrine of allegiance was no 
longer politically tenable; leading inexorably to a stark disparity between 
notions of territorial sovereignty and individual national identity. As the 
Empire slowly withdrew and new sovereign states emerged, the common 
and extra-territorial notion of monarchical allegiance thus became 
increasingly inappropriate, hindering the efforts of emerging nations 
clearly to delineate the particular individuals over whom they had control, 
and—seemingly more importantly—to whom they were obliged to render 
the right of residence.
Beyond such pragmatic considerations, however, the reworking of the 
basis for ‘Britishness,’ and more particularly the seemingly final rejection 
of Lord Coke’s feudally-flavoured though ‘naturally’ universal delineation 
of national belonging on the basis of birth in the Realm and a mutual, 
albeit hierarchical, relationship between sovereign and subject,26 27 likewise 
raises a vital philosophical/constitutional question. That is, in reworking 
the basis for the notion of belonging to the (British) state, had post-war 
reform likewise re-adjusted the status of Britons within the state? Further, 
had the UK at last dispensed with its outdated adherence to incoherent 
notions of monarchical allegiance and the curious dichotomy between legal 
subjecthood and political citizenship; establishing instead a contractual 
notion of national belonging and a constitutionally coherent concept of the 
Briton as citizen?
1.1. The Demise of Allegiance: Ethnicity vs Contractualism?
The common law notion of allegiance which governed nationality both 
in Britain and throughout the Empire/Commonwealth up until 1948, was 
clearly concerned with far more than the formal identification of British 
subjects. Rather, with its natural law roots and reliance upon a feudal 
idiom of organic and hierarchical belonging, it not only expressed the 
common law’s underlying disdain for man-made notions of nation and 
statehood, but was likewise an accurate reflection of British thinking on 
the concept of the state and the relationship of the individual with that 
state. On the one hand, its limited degree of extra-territoriality228 and
226 The issue of immigration control not merely dominating UK nationality debates, but 
likewise being determinative throughout most of the Commonwealth, cf, A. 
Dummet/A. Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others, op cit, n 71.
227 Supra, II.B.l.




























































































universalism were an attempt to re-create the original ‘natural law of 
nations,’ and so to ameliorate the exclusionary nature of territorial state 
law. On the other, the hierarchical relationship it established between 
individual Briton and Monarch was likewise reflective of the UK rejection 
of republican notions of citizenship and statehood, or the concept of a state 
made up fellow-members or citizens. In short: as many individuals as 
possible were to be afforded the legal protection which the status of 
subjecthood embodied; such subjecthood, however, would not entail 
membership of the British state or body politic.229
In this, its ability to reflect philosophical thinking on the concept of the 
state and the relationship of the individual to the state, the ancient doctrine 
of allegiance thus shares much in common with more modem bodies of 
nationality law. Although a highly complex body of norms with its own 
internal rationality, nationality law is nonetheless generally seen as being 
integral to the state-based concept of the citizen. First, acting as the vital 
gateway to the enjoyment of material rights of citizenship;2* and further, its 
pivotal distinction between ins soli and ins sanguinis, being no more than 
the legal manifestation of divergent notions of ethnic and contractual 
(nation) statehood. In other words, ‘the other side of the coin to the 
enjoyment of material rights’2’1 of citizenship, nationality law likewise 
reflects the two particular bases of national belonging and modem 
statehood: the first, a backward-looking and exclusionary communitarian 
concept, restricting national membership and (at the very least) political 
rights of citizenship to an imagined ethnic and pre-political community 
existing prior to a state created exclusively to serve its needs; the second, a 
contractualist concept which is based upon the republican proposition that 
the state is commensurate with the voluntaristic will of its own citizens, 
and accordingly adopts an automatic and inclusionary approach to the 
bestowal of the full range of citizenship rights upon its nationals. In other 
words, in this the contractual scheme of statehood, nationality equals 
citizenship.
Seen in this light, the final demise of the common law doctrine of 
allegiance is not merely interesting in its own right, but also begs the 
question of whether the UK had finally adopted a modem form of *251
229 Supra, Il.B.
2,0 PreuB, ‘Zum verfassungstheoretischen Begriff des Staatsbiirgers in der modemen 
Gesellschaft,’ loc cit, n 64.





























































































statehood and if so which one. In other words, a natural conception of the 
Briton which had long sought to maintain the universality of subjecthood 
and to resist the pressure to link the natural rights of the UK subject to the 
positive law of the British state, had nonetheless at last succumbed to the 
demand of a modem world that personal status, together with the rights 
normally flowing from that status, be more clearly delineated on territorial 
lines. The ‘natural’ universalism of British subjecthood was at last to be 
territorially qualified. In the word of one parliamentary commentator, the 
1948 Act’s establishment of United Kingdom and Colonies citizenship had 
likewise:
...created a new geographical; and territorial entity known as the ‘United Kingdom
and Colonies'...232
Had this new territorial citizenship, however, similarly reconstituted this 
new geographical entity, giving explicit voice to an ethnic or contractual 
notion of statehood and a conceptually comprehensive UK citizen?
1.2. The Citizen Doubted
The brief answer to this question, however, is no. First, given the United 
Kingdom’s continuing ethnic diversity and on-going role as a country of 
net immigration, a pre-political and communitarian basis for national 
belonging continued to be highly inappropriate. Soil and not blood 
remained the well-spring of national feeling. Alternatively, as noted in the 
House of Lords during debates on the 1981 Act:
What has made us British is that out ancestors came here and that their children
were bom here.2’3
Accordingly, ius soli, though sadly qualified by the 1981 Act,234 retained 
its formally regulatory status, determining that the vast majority of those 
bom within the ever diminishing territory of the UK—post 1981, minus 
even its remaining colonies—would, by organic association and quite 
regardless of race, creed or religion, be deemed to be British citizens. 
Indeed, disregard for communitarian notions of national belonging was 
such that the one historic manifestation of ius sanguinis in UK law was 
likewise to be foreclosed: the 1981 Act providing that children bom 
outside the United Kingdom to at least one British parent, might become
232 Lord Altrincham, Hansard [House of Lords, 21 June 1948], at 989.
233 Lord Elwyn-Jones, Hansard [House of Lords, 22 June 1981], at 860.
234 Restricting ius soli to the children of parents ‘legally settled’ within the UK at the 




























































































British only if that parent had themselves been bom within the UK.23' 
Nationality by descent would apply to one generation only, and race would 
play no part within the post-war concept of the British state and citizen.
More interestingly, however, was the vehemence of the UK Parliament’s 
eschewal of a contractual basis for notions of British belonging. The new 
statutory notion of ius soli derived citizenship notwithstanding, the 1948 
Government was eager to assure an anxious Parliament that the retarded 
recognition by British law of the term ‘citizen,’ and indeed the corollary 
demise of the ‘subject,’ should neither be taken as an insult by those who 
were loyal to the Monarch, nor be regarded as a foolish attempt to 
introduce republican and possibly revolutionary principles into the United 
Kingdom. The Secretary of State, responding to concerns that the adoption 
of UK and Colonies citizenship would both weaken affection for the 
Crown and give false hope to those ‘colonial natives’ who remained 
without a political assembly of their own,® was thus happy to note that in 
British law, as in other less worldly kingdoms, the word ‘citizen’ would 
diverge from the meaning more commonly ascribed to it by political 
philosophy.
I do not think that there is anything revolutionary in a person being called British
citizen. After all Bunyan in the Pilgrim’s Progress refers to the citizenship of
Heaven, and as far I know heaven is not conducted on republican Principles.* 237 238
Similarly, the authoritative voice of ‘the law’ in the person of the Lord 
Chancellor, was keen to add its weighty assurance that citizenship of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies had nothing at all to do with contractual 
notions of government and would thus not act as the vital gateway to 
material rights:
Citizenship gives no rights and privileges whatsoever.258
Equally, by the same token, it would not furnish the individual Briton 
with a solid bulwark against potentially offensive parliamentary law­
making:
Hitherto we have not had any law discriminating against any British subject. I
hope we never shall, but I do not know. If you are minded to discriminate, you can
2” Nationality was previously acquired by virtue of simple registration with British 
consulates.
254 Somewhat reactionary concerns, though most elegantly expressed, cf, by Lord 
Altrincham, loc cit, n 232, at 990 et seq.
237 Ede, Hansard [House of Commons, Vol. 5], at 393.




























































































discriminate whether you call them ‘subjects' or whether you call them 
‘citizens.’2”
In short: as ever, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty was to remain 
the defining characteristic of the British Constitution—determining that 
whilst a terminological shift to citizenship had taken place, the new citizen 
would nonetheless not be incorporated within the British state and body 
politic, or alternatively be equipped with automatic access to a series of 
rights which might thus fetter the ‘constitutive’ Parliament. Contractualism 
and voluntaristic statehood were therefore forever to remain foreign to the 
UK.
A stance maintained throughout the post war years, the non­
incorporation of the UK citizen was most clearly expressed in the 1977 
Bill introducing what was to become the 1981 British Nationality Act. 
Paragraph 2 of that document, entitled civic privileges, thus confidently 
asserts:
An important aspect of citizenship is the privileges associated with it. In this 
country the common status of British subject,* 240 held in our law not only by 
citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but by all Commonwealth citizens, 
carries with it voting and other privileges. There are also special arrangements for 
citizens of the Irish Republic. Such privileges do not stem from the law of 
nationality and so are not dealt with in this document.
Alternatively, the drafter, though clearly cognisant of the usual meaning 
afforded the term ‘citizen,’ nonetheless subtly altered its formulation so as 
to reflect the UK Parliament’s abiding refusal to base its legitimacy upon 
it. First, the language is of privilege and not of right. Secondly, those 
privileges, which Parliament may, if it feels it to be appropriate, extend to 
British citizens may also be and is conferred upon non-British citizens.241 
Thirdly, and as a consequence, the whole basis of contractualism is 
rejected: Parliament is not constituted by British citizens with automatic 
access to political rights—their right to vote instead being fully contingent 
upon the body which claims to represent them.
There is undoubtedly a paradox in such a conclusion. Much of the 
immediate post-war re-alignment in notions of ‘Britishness’ thus derived 
from a fairly honest desire to recognise the claim of post-colonial and
2M Ibid.
240 This dormant status, however, now defunct (BNA 1981).
241 Both UK resident Commonwealth citizens and a significant group of Irish citizens 





























































































emerging nations’ to all the accoutrements of modem statehood, including 
a contractual and egalitarian notion of citizenship. As the British 
Parliament conceded:
Many of them [sic: the new nations] associate the word ‘subject’ with being 
members of a subject race.20
Further, their ‘new nationalism’ or feeling that they were ‘self-governing 
communities,’ was to be respected by the British Parliament’s linguistic 
sensitivity in giving preference to the notion of citizenship of the 
commonwealth above that of British subjecthood:24 43
...we must throw overboard the old conception of a British subject as something 
imposed from above, and we must then come to the new conception of the 
common factor based on Dominion citizenship, the terms of which shall be 
enunciated by each Dominion.244
In other words: for the Commonwealth an equal citizenship based upon 
a common community of horizontal association; for the UK, however, a 
seemingly empty citizenship imposed upon a British populace by its own 
Parliament.245
1.3. The Basis for National Belonging?
Given the absence of any clear legal commitment to notions of ethnic or 
contractual citizenship a question nonetheless remains as to what beyond 
the remedial affection for ‘soil’ now forms the basis for a specific notion of 
belonging to the UK. An issue which has gained in importance as the 
territorial extent of the concept of British citizenship has slowly been 
eroded, the answer nonetheless remains somewhat elusive; successive 
administrations slowly beginning to adopt the notion of a ‘close 
connection’ with the UK,246 but failing clearly to enunciate its meanings.
242 Secretary of State (Ede), Hansard [House of Commons, 7 July 1948], at 470.
243 Supra, note 218, Emrys Roberts, Hansard, [House of Commons, 7 July 1948], at 433.
244 Ibid.
245 Note, however, that the failure coherently to reconstitute the state and citizenry was 
one prevalent throughout the Commonwealth—Australia only very recently having 
established a contractual link between its populace and Parliament—with radical 
constitutional overhaul seemingly being confined to States such as India who no 
longer recognised the British Monarch as a Head of State. V.K. Shukla & D.N. 
Singh, The Constitution of India (Eastern Book Co.: Lucknow 1975). Regal 
institutions it would thus seem, do not fit at all well with modem philosophical 
constructs.




























































































In other words, with the arrival of 1981 British Nationality Act which 
for the first time created a distinct category of British citizenship limited to 
the territory of the United Kingdom, the question of a distinct national 
belonging would appear to have become an imperative one. True to form, 
however, the foundations of the nation remained indistinct. Thus, while in 
the ran up to parliamentary the Conservative Political Centre was to 
promote radical reform with a document tantalisingiy entitled ‘Who Do 
We Think We Are?,’217 the underlying issue of who exactly might be said 
to ‘belong to Britain,’247 48 and on what basis, was not to be addressed 
directly, but was instead to be lost in the mass of technical provisions 
skirting their way around the ‘political and legislative minefield' of the 
transition from colonial to national citizenship.
Indeed, the sole indication that the political community had given any 
consideration whatsoever to the need to create a distinctly national sense of 
community was the qualification of the notion of ius soli, British 
citizenship now being acquired by birth within the UK only where one 
parent was legally settled within the Country at the time.249
Greeted by the most infamous voice in post-war nationality debates with 
the words:
...the old principle of allegiance which we turned out of doors in 1948, is found 
not to be dead but sleeping; for allegiance is the very essence of nationhood, there 
is no meaning in nationhood without allegiance...250
the qualification of ius soli might thus be read as an attempt to limit 
British citizenship to those demonstrating ‘loyalty,’ or a positive 
commitment to the mores of British society, and more particularly to a 
sense of legality or respect for the law.
However, given first that this provision was to attract the greatest degree 
of criticism of all post-war legislation, the contempt for it amongst the 
institutions of UK civil society perhaps best summed up by a House of 
Lords considering it to be
...morally questionable and racially decisive.251
247 Conservative Political Centre, London, March 1980.
248 Ibid, at 6.
249 BNA 1981, SS 50 (l)-(4), in connection with S 33 (1) of the 1971 Immigration Act, 
no illegal entrant under the former might claim to be settled under the latter.
250 Enoch Powell, Hansard [House of Commons, Vol 997 1980/1] at 967.




























































































And further, that it appeared to act as little more than a somewhat petty 
instrument of immigration control, potentially rendering various persons 
stateless.252 It is nonetheless tempting to conclude that qualified ius soli had 
but little to do with establishing a degree of philosophical concordance 
between the individual Briton and the institutions of the British State. On 
the contrary, it had instead undermined the ‘principles upon which the 
moral consensus’ which had anciently characterised the nation had been 
built;253 representing an assault by the sovereign British political 
community’s upon the true essence of the doctrine of allegiance—the 
notion of a natural universalism existing prior to and being unassailable by 
the institutions of a territorial and man-made political state.
1.4. Conclusion
At one level, the final passage into UK law of a curiously empty term of 
‘citizenship,’ may be argued to be both a result and a reflection of a UK 
Constitution which in placing sovereignty in the hands of a parliamentary 
political community, both acted as a barrier to the conceptually coherent 
post-war re-constituting of the British state and enabled that same political 
community to refashion the basis for Britishness through simple and 
philosophically-empty political edicts.
As such, nationality legislation had the curious effect of undermining 
certain of the foundations of UK constitutionalism, whilst also confirming 
and leaving the structural Constitution in tact. With regard to the issue of 
the relationship of individual Briton to British state, this determined that 
while on the one hand, a new category of Britons had been established; on 
the other, the relationship maintained between those new Britons and 
British State would alter little. The limitation of the universalism which 
allegiance had entailed was thus likewise to herald a curtailment of the 
natural notion of Britons existing prior to and independently from the 
British body politic. Parliament and political law it seemed would play the 
primary part in identifying Britons. However, by the same token, the body 
politic or Parliament would not admit such newly identified Britons into 
the British State. Allegiance was not to be replaced by contractualism, and 
whilst the Briton may have been identified by Parliament he was not to be 
‘created’ or positively constituted by higher rights. Instead, *25
252 That is those bom in the UK failing both to gain UK citizenship or the nationality of 
their parents.
255 The Roman Catholic Bishops of Britain and Wales, cited by Lord Elwyn-Jones, 




























































































‘representation' remained the mode by which a connection between a by 
now very curiously ‘detached’ British populace and body politic was to be 
established.
Interestingly, however, the continuing and unique enfranchisement 
within the UK of Commonwealth and Irish citizens—or the representation 
of non-Britons within the British body politic—would similarly seem to 
indicate that while the ‘natural’ shoot of UK universalism had finally been 
uprooted, its practical effects nonetheless lingered on. Accordingly, the 
same may be said for the Briton’s natural autonomy, or the preservation of 
a wide sphere of private action, having little to do with the state and being 
regulated instead by a non-political common law. In abstract juridical 
terms, the continuing existence of a private sphere ‘without’ the state is 
confirmed by the legal edict that whilst allegiance plays no longer plays a 
part in determining Britishness, ‘it nonetheless flows from it;”54 so re­
establishing—presumably on a somewhat feudal basis—the individual 
Briton’s loyalty to Monarchical authority (by now merely symbolic) and a 
common law arguably pre-dating political authority.254 55 In real terms, 
however, the continuing importance of the pre-statal private sphere in UK 
society may likewise be demonstrated by the other side of the coin to post­
war nationality legislation—the Race Relations Act or the ‘privatisation’256 
of the issue of race relations and the manipulation of the common law ‘rule 
of law’ to ensure on-going and civic social development.
2. Race and the Rule of Law
As one very convincing thesis would have it,257 post-war nationality 
reform together with the evolution of a policy to soothe troubled race 
relations, was a clear latter-day manifestation of modem British 
government’s continuing adherence to both the pre-occupations and 
institutional tactics of the ancien regime. Supposedly large-scale 
immigration from the former colonies and commonwealth had precipitated 
a degree of social unrest within the UK; the move to a multi-racial society 
being marked not only by the institutionalisation of openly racist
254 O. Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th Edition) 
(Butterworths: London 1987).
255 More immediately in relation to the common law notion of treason, but by 
association confirming the ‘original,’ ie pre-Dicean bond between populace and 
common law.





























































































sentiments within organisations such as the National Front, but also by an 
ever-increasing degree of racial violence. As the ‘white’ backlash reached 
crescendo in the early 1970s with Enoch Powell’s notorious ‘rivers of 
blood’ declaration, the British political establishment was drawn to tackle 
the traditional bugbear of British social life: potential social conflict.-'8 The 
policy instruments which were chosen to deal with perennial nightmare of 
social upheaval, however, were the traditional ones of ‘paternalist 
leadership’ together with a reliance upon a private non-statal sphere and 
the regulatory functions of the rule of law.
2.1. The Paternalistic Political Elite?
In short, or so it is argued, the empty formulation of Britishness to be 
found in British nationality law was a pragmatic political means whereby 
UK successive governments could respond to certain of society’s demands 
that immigration be slowly restricted without, however, ever fully 
stemming the flow of migrants or, more importantly, inflaming social 
conflict by engaging in an explicit discussion of whether British society be 
possessed of certain unifying cultural or moral characteristics. As always, 
the issue of immigration and cultural identity would not be subject to the 
potentially illiberal forces of radical democracy and instead the British 
populace would be guided by a benign political elite which would legislate 
‘in the best interests of the nation.’ In this manner, the political and social 
minefield of post-colonial national adjustment would be safely negotiated. 
And indeed, or so it is maintained, the obfuscating policy of the 
establishment was so successful that within the remarkably short period of 
20 years, white supremacist movements had more or less disappeared from 
the UK scene, whilst the credo that the UK was a ‘multi-racial’ and ‘multi­
cultural’ society was not so much a commonplace as an apparently 
immemorial facet of British life.
Whilst in purely legal terms, it is nigh on impossible to verify whether 
post-war political thinking followed the traditional Blackstonian or Dicean 
principles that the interests of the nation were best to be served by keeping 
the ‘foolish’ Briton as far away from politics as possible, it is nonetheless 
apparent that nationality debates did clearly link the issue of national 
citizenship with that of race relations, and were likewise marked by an 
unusual degree of (self-satisfied) paternalism. In the mind of Britain’s 





























































































propensity to open discrimination and disorder had been handled in an 
exemplary manner:
We have a problem of community relations as everyone knows. I believe that we 
in this country have handled it as an example to the rest of the world, and 1 believe 
that we can and shall continue to do so.25"
Equally, however, and beyond such legislative paternalism, the second 
plank of the political establishment’s mission to dampen social disorder 
and ease the transition to a new form of national citizenship—the Race 
Relations Act and residual reliance upon the self-regulatory characteristics 
of a private sphere governed by the rule of law—left a clear legal mark, so 
furnishing a normative key to current UK thinking upon national 
citizenship.
2.2. The Rule of Law: the ‘Privatisation’ of Race Relations
As noted, much of the emptiness within the post-war definition of 
‘Britishness’ is argued to have derived from a political pragmatism which 
saw successive administrations avoid upon the existence of supposedly 
defining national characteristics in an effort to avert social conflict.
Beyond such pragmatic considerations, however, the failure either to 
incorporate the British populace or to ascribe to it any supposedly inherent 
cultural moral or ethnic characteristics likewise seemed to reaffirm the 
historical concept of a detached and non-statal ‘community’ of Britons. 
Though the unbounded universalism of the doctrine of allegiance had been 
somewhat restricted. Britons remained ‘ill-defined’ and so continued 
vitally to differ in their identity from Frenchmen. Alternatively, as the 
moral persona of French citizens is still inextricably linked with the 
philosophy of the Republic and the French Nation, the French are ‘French 
first,’ and only secondly social individuals with a series of ‘natural’ 
relationships of their own.M Britons, by contrast are not inevitably a part of 
the British state, do not derive their moral characteristics from it, and are 
so primarily ‘natural’ and social individuals with only a secondary 
‘representative’ attachment to a British body politic. In other words, 
whereas in French state theory, ‘Nation,’ ‘Republic’ and individual identity 
are necessarily conflated,259 6061 the altogether more fluid contours of the UK 
Constitution determine that the national polity has no philosophical or
259 Reginald Maudlin, Hansard [8 March 1971], at 42.





























































































identity-forming primacy and that ‘Britishness’ remains a natural or 
social—rather than political—construct.
Seen in this light, the Race Relations Act of 1976 which sought to 
ensure racial equality not through a positive or statal commitment to a 
higher ‘right’ of non-discrimination, but which instead introduced a 
‘private’ notion of non-discriminatory social interaction, becomes 
significant for two interrelated reasons. First, once again determining that 
the state and/or polity play no part in the constituting of individuals or the 
definition of cultural identity. And conversely, augmenting the common 
law notion of the ‘rule of law’ to take account of questions of race, so 
furnishing a pre-statal private sphere with a regulatory framework in which 
to evolve its own view of ‘Britishness.’
The essential characteristics of the Act—its immediate application to 
private relationships and the room which it leaves for cultural self­
definition—thus re-affirm the primacy of a natural British society above a 
philosophically-construed polity. First, ‘race’ is a matter of civic social 
relations in a private sphere and not one of positive higher rights which are 
established by and may be asserted against the body politic. Unlike 
continental schemes, the UK did not first establish protective rights for 
minorities against the state and then extend such protection to private 
social interaction/61 Rather, the process began in the private sphere: a 
blanket obligation not to discriminate in employment or contractual 
relationships, representing a strengthening of the rule of law between non- 
statal actors so as to take account of race.265 Equally, however, the state or 
polity played no part in defining which ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ characteristics 
were to be protected by British law. Instead, applied by common law 
courts, the simple and unspecified ban on all discrimination upon the 
grounds of ‘race, ethnicity or national origin,’ opened up a social and 
pluralist process of cultural self-definition with various groups and 
individuals applying for and receiving protection on the basis of their own 
subjective—rather than the state’s—perception of ethnic and national 
difference.26 *64
262 Or alternatively, beginning with hierarchical constitutional rights and then 
developing a horizontal doctnne of Dritrwirkung.
26:1 Though note that the introduction of a positive ‘duty' into the notion of the rule of 
law is a slight variation on tradition UK (English) legal thinking—the rule of law 
more generally relating to the weighing up of existing interests or ‘rights,’ more 
specifically property and contractual rights. Equally, in this sphere of the rule of law, 
the state is itself best conceived of as a private actor.




























































































With the broad result of such a privatised scheme of good race relations 
being the gradual evolution of the much-famed notion of ‘multi- 
culturalism within one nation,’ parliamentary additions to the notion of the 
rule of law thus laid down a naturally universalist (ie, free from 
constructed political/philosophical considerations) view of civic equality 
which so allowed a non-statal UK society to decide for itself which would 
become the prevailing view of ‘Britishness.’ Insulated from any political 
guidance or philosophical insistence upon supposedly prevailing moral or 
cultural characteristics, a private sphere regulated only by the common law 
made its own post-war adjustment to a de-colonial world; so enabling a 
natural transition to a pluralist, multi-racial and multi-cultural concept of 
citizenship within the territorial borders of the UK.
3. Conclusion
The withdrawal of British citizenship within the territorial borders of the 
United Kingdom, is thus indicative of a curious post-war process whereby 
large-scale social and political change was achieved without a substantial 
alteration in the foundations of the British Constitution. The apparent 
predominance of the political community notwithstanding, the underlying 
vision of the British State and the relation of the Briton to the state was to 
alter little.
The pivotal element ensuring such constitutional atrophy, however, was 
the continued reliance upon the Dicean edict that political institutions and 
not the populace be sovereign. An anti-contractarian view of the British 
State which at once allowed Parliament radically to alter the legal basis for 
‘belonging’ to Britain; the enduring sovereignty of Parliament rather than 
the people, likewise acted as a bulwark against the coalescing of concepts 
of state, nationhood and the body politic. The Briton remained what he had 
ever been: autonomous. Whilst ‘identified’ by Parliament he was not 
‘created’ by the state and instead retained a wide non-statal sphere of 
private action in which he himself might determine the social contours of a 
notion of ‘Britishness.’ Equally, while the unbounded ‘natural’ 
universalism of Lord Cooke’s concept of allegiance had succumbed to the 
immediate political demands of one political elite, it had in large measure 
been reborn in the 'naturally inclusive’ provisions of the Race Relations 
Act; so ensuring that the on-going social construction of post-war 
‘Britishness’ never be delimited by (man-made) issues of race, culture or, 
perhaps more importantly, by demands for a philosophical concordance 




























































































individual first: his attachment to the body politic being only a secondary 
matter of representation within the Sovereign Parliament.
A double-edged sword, the anti-voluntarism at the heart of the British 
Constitution determined that the Briton—never constituted by positive 
rights—would retain his curious dual status. On the one hand, a legal 
subject with a wide-ranging and private sphere of autonomy existing 
outside the British state. On the other, a political citizen represented within 
rather than constituted by and constituting of, a potentially despotic, and 
often paternalistic body politic.
B. The Decline of the Industrial Citizen?
In its purest normative formulation, modem notions of welfare or social 
citizenship are often argued to represent the apex of citizenship 
evolution.165 Alternatively, with its emphasis upon ‘substantive equality’ 
and ‘inclusion,’ the threefold scheme of core civic, intermediate political 
and additional social rights, seems once and for all to settle the historical 
dilemma of how to establish a balance between the civically and politically 
empowered but potentially self-interested individual citizen, and the 
demand of the political community, or polis, for a sustaining degree of 
social cohesion.265 66 In a very modem social contract, the 16th Century 
voluntaristic pact between individual and state is therefore extended 
beyond the sphere of purely formal civic and political equality to instead 
include a measure of substantive social justice; so constraining the 
potentially selfish tendencies of the formally autonomous citizen, and thus 
establishing and securing a universal community upon the basis of shared 
social rights, or substantive and equal opportunity.
Community-forming and community-securing, the concept of social 
citizenship has nonetheless latterly been subject to a degree of pressure; 
with many western democracies curtailing the breadth of social rights as 
demographic changes and internationalised wealth-creation have 
dramatically curtailed the social budgets of developed nations.267 This 
financial squeeze upon the extended contractual vision of substantive 
equality has been noted in the United Kingdom as elsewhere; and yet, the 
precipitous decline of social citizenship within the UK might likewise be 
argued to stem from deeper structural roots, or the inherent instability of
265 R. Dahrendorf. Der modeme soziale Konflikt, op cit, n 16.
266 Supra. II.A.3.3.




























































































the 1945 constitutional moment which—ever true to institutional 
conservatism—failed effectively to translate a particularist claim for social 
redress into a universal and community-building concept of social equality.
1. Social vs Industrial Citizenship: Community vs Particularism?
Alternatively, or so it is increasingly argued,26' T.H. Marshall’s famous 
analysis of citizenship evolution draws heavily upon historical 
circumstances peculiar to the UK and consequently locates the genesis of 
modem social citizenship not in a uncontested normative desire for 
sustainable community, but rather in a factual and drawn-out process of 
class tension and schism.268 69 The preference for the term ‘industrial’ above 
‘social’ citizen is thus not incidental, but instead has firm roots in the 
insistence that the western notion of citizenship itself entailed an apparent 
contradiction: the formal equality endowing characteristics of civic and 
market-forming rights nonetheless leading to substantive inequality as 
feudal economics were overcome and a market-economy predicated on 
inequality, or the creation of a disadvantaged industrial class, was 
established.
Thus, in the United Kingdom at least, the primary significance of civic 
rights lay not in their moral property, or normative confirmation of the 
inherent equality of man. But rather in their practical ability to secure 
‘contract’ above ‘status;’ so laying the basis for a market system itself 
promoting of and predicated upon inequality. In turn, those substantively 
impaired by the market process—or an industrial class—were to find a 
common interest in their inequality, or a collective will powerful enough to 
ensure—through struggle—first, political representation and then a 
measure of wealth-redistribution. In short, industrial citizenship within the 
UK was both an inevitable result of class struggle, and an institutional 
fulcrum; serving social order by correcting—through social provision—the 
substantive social disparity which derived from formal civic equality.
Given the central position of the notions of struggle—as well as the 
predominance of particularist class interests—within the history of the 
evolution of UK industrial citizenship, an immediate question therefore 
arises as to the exact nature of the constitutional moment of 1945. Was it a 
political or constitutional event? Alternatively, was the social reform 
which it initiated simply a case of satisfying the immediate and potentially
268 For various authors and arguments, cf, A. Favel, Philosophies of Integration, op cit,
7.




























































































revolutionary demands of the socially disadvantaged; or did it entail some 
deeper attempt to ‘normativise’ industrial citizenship, so taking it out of its 
historically conflictual (and seemingly utilitarian context) and building 
instead a clear and on-going constitutional commitment to a community­
forming and community-securing concept of social citizenship? Was a 
modem social contract to be formed between all Britons; an explicit and 
class-neutral notion of social justice evolving out of what had been a long 
history of socially-divisive industrial conflict?
2. Collectivism and Sovereignty: The Unholy Alliance?
At the level of pure political analysis, the UK Welfare State in which the 
post-war notion of social/industrial citizenship was embedded, is sharply 
distinguished from its continental and Scandinavian counterparts.270 Where 
some nations sought to give individuals eternal primacy over market 
processes through higher—state-mediated—rights, while yet others sought 
to reconstitute the entire free-market process through its eternal marriage 
with the regulatory Sozialstaat, the UK followed a curiously haphazard 
course. On the one hand, eschewing both higher rights or a comprehensive 
restructuring and taming of the private economy. And on the other, 
selectively creating pockets of ‘joint national ownership,’ while allowing 
simple universal access to newly-created institutions of wealth 
redistribution such as the health service.
Moving beyond this structural consideration, however, it is equally 
readily apparent that the new social citizenship of the Briton (embedded 
within the Welfare State) had thus not entailed the normative reshaping of 
the UK Constitution. Neither were social rights entrenched; nor was the 
free market to be coherently refashioned to suit the demands of the 
representative state.271 Instead, the new pact between Briton and British 
State was secured simply by a purely political and highly selective 
programme of nationalisation,272 underpinned by a political and collectivist 
notion of ‘joint national wealth ownership.’
Alternatively, Attlee’s Government had chosen not to give explicit 
expression to its goal of establishing social parity through a radical 
reconstituting of the body politic; and had instead relied upon the
270 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three World o f Welfare Capitalism, op cit, n 209.
271 Alternatively, the public/private divide be re-adjusted.
272 Thus, for example, the finance markets almost entirely escaped any governmental 
intervention into their activities; such enormous wealth it would seem would never 




























































































constitutive power of a parliamentary sovereign to effect the necessary 
changes in UK economic organisation. In other words, the ascendant 
Labour creed of ‘collectivism’—or the notion of a unitary national desire 
for social parity273—was simply to be wed with parliamentary sovereignty. 
In terms of the national community, the Sovereign in Parliament was thus 
deemed to embody a collective national will to push through social 
change; while the political community was itself adjudged to be the natural 
mouthpiece of the British populace’s supposedly indivisible desire for 
substantive and universal equality. The joint national will desired a 
universal and community-building social compact, and parliamentary 
legislation—being no more than an expression of the national will—would 
effect that compact.
In purely Dicean terms, the 1945 Parliament appeared thus to have taken 
on the guise of the collectivist and despotic sovereign which had been the 
bugbear of individualistic utilitarian thought.274 Foolishly casting aside 
centuries of self-limiting political tradition, the newly empowered Labour 
government had deviated fatally from the Dicean creed that collective 
welfare was commensurate with restrained political action dedicated solely 
to securing individual freedom. It had further, and more damagingly. recast 
the political community’s role: no longer regarding the Sovereign 
Parliament as a benign mentor to an essentially private British populace— 
and on the contrary, giving it a role as the positive expression of the joint 
and immutable will of a collectivised rather than individualistic nation.
Moving beyond such possibly outmoded views, however, Attlee’s 
attempt to reconstitute parliamentary legislation as a positive expression of 
a collective national will, was likewise to draw much contemporary 
criticism from within the very social movement from which it had sprung. 
Most significant was a long-running critique on the part of pluralist 
elements within the Labour party, who had long held that the simple
273 Note that the post WWI re-alignment in the Labour movement which saw the Labour 
party sever its few remaining bonds with liberalism and instead evolve a collective 
approach to the securing of national welfare, was the determinative factor in post-war 
British politics: collectivism likewise heralding an explicit attempt to create a ‘statist’ 
rather than ‘individualistic’ view of British government. With a new conservatism 
likewise shedding any links with the liberally-tainted Toryism of the 18th century, the 
new ‘statism’ was similarly to become a vehicle for nationalistic (though not 
necessarily socially welfare-oriented) conservative post-war politics, S. Beer, Modem 






























































































equation of sovereign power with an indivisible national will was no more 
than a crude manipulation of complex social and political processes. The 
pluralist critique—having an import far beyond the border of the United 
Kingdom—thus bemoaned the efforts to transfigure a numerically limited 
but sovereign political community into a supposedly natural expression of 
collective voice. Society needed change to ensure social justice, but such 
change could not simply be brought about by shallow tinkering with the 
philosophical basis underlying the exercise of sovereign power. Attlee had 
vision, but not enough:
They see that the historic formulae of representative government—whether in its 
parliamentary or congressional form—are no longer adequate to the kind of 
society in which we live. But they make, I think, the mistake of assuming that the 
problem is solved when a reconstruction of the pattern has taken place, however 
adequate that reconstruction may be. They believe that there is some mechanism 
for making sovereignty an expression of what Rousseau termed the general will of 
the Community.2”
Certainly, Attlee had come some way to meeting the demands of Britons 
that true social equality be established; dispensing once and for all with the 
UK’s clinging adherence to limited notions of government and the political 
community’s restriction of its and the state’s role to the securing of the 
formal civic equality of the Briton. However, in being based upon the 
equally dubious collectivist notion that the parliamentary sovereign 
naturally represented the joint and indivisible will of the nation, he had 
failed dismally to secure a lasting, socially-receptive contract between 
British people and the state. In a pluralist twist, the conflation of between 
sovereign power and collective will was, for all that it was well-meaning:
Profoundly mistaken for the simple reason that there is no general will in the 
Community at all. We never encounter any will that can be denominated good by 
definition27"
Alternatively, though so often seen as an import into the British Isles 
and clearly disapproving of many of the UK’s prevailing normative 
preconceptions,275 677 pluralist thought nonetheless appeared to draw heavily 
upon the ancient notion of a British society existing independently from
275 Laski, ‘Law and the State,’ loc cit, n 2, at 212.
276 Ibid, at 212.
277 In a strange continuum which saw the genesis of UK pluralist critiques in Maitland’s 
translation of Gierke's, Political Theories of the Middle Age, op cil n 143; a work 
which in Germany seemed only to contribute to the most extreme of collectivist 





























































































and outside the state: the body politic could not simply claim to be the 
natural expression of the joint will of what was—with the full blessing of 
centuries of anti-statist constitutional thinking—a disparate and self­
defining group of individuals and associations:
A number of minds does not become one mind any more than a wood is a tree or a 
hive a bee. The will of the state is the will of certain persons exercising certain 
powers278
Worse still, unadulterated even by any constitutional limitations—or 
refusing ever to admit of any formal contractual relationship with the 
British people279—and likewise continuing to build upon historically 
paternalistic patterns of political leadership,280 the British parliamentary 
sovereign appeared the most ill-equipped of institutions to make a claim to 
being the natural expression of the national will. In its own way as absurd 
a fiction as the elitist mixed commonwealth of 18th Century thought,281 the 
collectivist re-working of the explicitly hierarchical and detached (from the 
populace) notion of parliamentary sovereignty, was a highly unstable basis 
upon which to build a universal and community-building notion of social 
justice.
Through its championing of parliamentary sovereignty, or in the words 
of one pluralist commentator, the UK’s ‘most baleful political 
inheritance,’282 the British Constitution had failed formally to recognise 
even the most rudimentary of social contracts. Voluntarism, or the notion 
that the body politic be created by the common will of the British people 
had long been rejected. In turn, the assertion that the sovereign Parliament 
had overnight become the natural representative of a collective and 
indivisible national desire for universal social justice would fail singularly 
to convince. Particularism had not been converted into universalism. A 
small group of politicians had instead hijacked the sovereign power and 
tailored it to meet the needs of the class it felt it represented. The golden 
opportunity to create a lasting and just social compact between state and
278 Laski, ‘Law and the State,’ loc cit, n 2, at 212.
279 Though to Laski himself higher law, at least in its national manifestation, was 
similarly an anathema—tending on the one hand, only to concretise the fictional 
general will imposed by one political community at one particular time, (‘Law and 
the State,’ loc cit n 2). and on the other to give far too great a degree of power to 
undemocratic judicial cadre (Parliamentary Government in England, op cit, n 68.
280 Supra, m.B.2.1.
281 Supra. II.B.2.la).




























































































Briton had been missed. The Welfare State and with it the notion of 
industrial citizenship remained a matter of the particularist conquest of 
common and sovereign institutions by isolated class interests. Within the 
UK’s still autonomous society, other interests and views would arise, and 
in time make their own particularist assault on the sovereign power. 
Attlee’s collectivism would be turned against the very Welfare State which 
it had created—Thatcher declaring instead that it be the national will to 
dismantle it."5
3. Conclusion
At the constitutionalist level, the politically contested nature of the UK’s 
retarded effort to establish some form of ‘(welfare)-statism’—and thus a 
sufficient degree of national community to secure on-going social parity— 
might be attributed to a constitutional atrophy which clung to an anti- 
voluntaristic concept of constitutionally unfettered parliamentary 
sovereignty. Statism could thus not achieve a secured normative status. 
Certainly, Attlee had attempted to alter the foundations of British patterns 
of governance: dispensing with the notion that the parliamentary sovereign 
merely identified and legislated for ‘the best interests of the nation,’ and 
promoting in its place the concept of a Sovereign Parliament which 
expressed the will of the ‘national community.’ However, the failure 
formally to incorporate Britons within the body politic which supposedly 
represented their will, was to have a dual and destructive effect. On the one 
hand, reinforcing the view that British society, being divorced from the 
British State, was far from being a cohesive national community, and was 
instead made up of a pluralist series of disparate private and associative 
interests with little if no common will. And on the other, contributing to 
the impression that the programmes of a normatively unfettered body 
politic were not the expression of an indivisible and politically- 
incontestable national will, but were instead little more than the ideological 
pronouncements of whichever particularist elite was in the parliamentary 
ascendancy.
Similarly, however, the failure normatively to secure post-war statism, 
equally explains the weak and contested nature of the post-war Briton’s 
social citizenship. As the Welfare State remained a politically contested 
project, the social citizenship embedded within it, could not be divorced 285
285 Supra, n 273: though the irony of an individualistic Conservative part calling upon 





























































































from the historical struggle from which it had sprung. Founded upon 
contingent political processes rather than an uncontested concept of social 
justice, social provision within the UK might never claim universal support 
from an ever elusive national community. Rather, social citizenship instead 
appeared to represent little more than the assault of particularist interests 
upon the national economic pie.
C. Post-Statal Citizenship?
It is common to present the conundrum of the creation of an effective 
citizenship of the European Union in terms of the difficulties of 
establishing a post-national citizenship.284 285 Alternatively, the greatest 
problem which the EU is argued to face is that of establishing a sense of 
loyalty (or allegiance) among European citizens for a supranational 
organisation possessing none of the positive community-forming 
characteristics of the Nation State. Ethnically, culturally and 
philosophically diverse, the European Union would thus seem 
exceptionally ill-suited to the task of creating binding horizontal bonds 
between its citizens, or ‘fellow-travellers’ in the post-national European 
project.
Rephrasing this initial analysis, however, it might likewise be argued 
that the major hurdle which a citizenship of the European Union must 
overcome is that of creating a post-statal relationship between the 
individual European and the EU. Nationhood, or a feeling of national 
belonging, it need thus be recalled is only one element within modern 
statal concepts of citizenship: the key to ‘deep’ variations upon a statal 
theme of citizenship whose core characteristic never alters.285 Citizenship is 
an indissoluble marriage between individual and state. Constituted by and 
constituting of the state, the individual citizen is indistinguishable from the 
state. His ‘moral’ properties defined by the state, the traditional state- 
citizen is citizen of the state first and ‘natural’ social animal second. An 
18th Century legacy, the inextricable linkage of ‘natural’ notions of 
individual moral personality with the positive higher law of the 
territorially-delimited state, was to undermine the ‘original law of nations.’ 
Mankind was no longer made of ‘one breadth of God,’286 and was instead 
variously ‘created’ by the man-made law of states.
284 Among others, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German 
Maastricht Decision,' (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 219.
285 Supra, 1.




























































































Seen in this light, the European Union's genesis as a simple 
international Treaty organisation and apparent continuing determination to 
eschew the accoutrements of statehood,187 would seem to hold the key to 
the EU citizenship dilemma. With little or no ambition to create the 
European, or to be constituted by its citizens, it still aspires to its own 
citizenship and the creation of ‘post-statal’ links between Europeans and 
the Union. Equally, in seeks in no small re-establish ‘the original law of 
nation;’ Europeans to be given personality beyond the narrow borders of 
their man-made states. In a final twist, however, the ‘deep’ concept of UK 
citizenship, based on ‘autonomy’ from and ‘representation’ within the 
body politic or state, might thus be argued to be instructive.
1. The Private European: Autonomy vs Belonging?
What is the European Union but a private sphere in which individual 
Europeans might act first a natural social beings, and only secondly as 
citizens of some man-made entity? Shielded by ‘stateless’ European law 
from the ‘unreasonable’ legislative activities of national body politics,287 88 
the European citizen might create for himself the contours of a post statal 
European society.
Seen in this light, the source of loyalty for the EU is surely not to be 
found in a notion of ‘belonging,’ but rather in a sense of ‘autonomy’ that 
liberates the individual from constructed communities which by virtue of 
their crude aggregative collectivism cannot but be repressive of individual 
or associative personality?
Certainly, autonomy will always bring with it a danger of uncivil and 
selfish behaviour. But once again, as the UK’s residual reliance upon the 
regulating functions of a stateless ‘rule of law’ demonstrates, a private 
sphere is not wholly dependent upon collective political or higher law­
making for the maintenance of civility. Instead, the simple legal 
mechanism that ensures that each individual exercise a pre-statal liberty 
with due respect for the autonomy of others, may be a mechanism as 
securing of liberty in a social setting as any inspirational (but man-made) 
call to higher individual rights.
287 Though some influential voices within the Union still plead for the formal 
constituting of a federal European state. Mancini, ‘The Case for European 
Statehood.’ (1998) 4:1, European Law Journal (forthcoming).




























































































Alternatively, might it not be argued that the most loyalty inspiring of 
European legal provisions be—not those positive economic rights which 
seem to recast the European citizen in the role of market citizen* 2*”—but 
those which are reflective of a nascent and regulatory European rule of 
law: more particularly, the duty not to discriminate?2”°
2. Political Community vs Representation?
With the Brunner Judgement of the German Federal Court.2”1 as to 
whether Europe might ever develop beyond a strictly delineated economic 
role: its ability to create a true political community being hampered by the 
cultural and linguistic diversity of citizens? In the minds of the German 
Justices it thus appeared that Europeans would never feel truly a part of 
European politics.
What then of representation? must the European be in possession of 
some quasi-spiritual link with the European political community ? Can that 
community not instead be regarded as but one grouping within a diverse 
and complex society; but one in which all Europeans are represented?
The benign political leadership of the 18th Century commonwealth with 
all its connotations of hierarchy and paternalism may well be inappropriate 
to a modem world. But, under conditions of increasing scientific, 
economic and political complexity, can there ever be any real objection to 
modem political and technical ‘expertise,’ legislating—not with any claim 
to being the authentic voice of a European community—but instead, in the 
‘best interests’ of Europeans?
IV. Conclusion
The UK’s rejection of Rousseau’s prescriptions on the nature of the state 
and citizen, may be no more than a historical accident: the reflection of the 
efforts of particular men at particular times to avert possibly revolutionary 
social disorder and to instead urge compromise upon the competing 
institutions of British political and social life. In the constant battle 
between people, Parliament and Monarchy, the ancient and at times archaic 
institutions of the Crown and common law were never to be fully uprooted. 
Instead, they continue to survive into a modem age acting as an immutable
285 Everson, ‘The legacy of the Market Citizen,’ in G, More & J. Shaw, New Legal 
Dynamic o f European Union, (Clarendon: Oxford 1995).
2"  Article 6 TEU.




























































































barrier to the reconstituting of the British state and its law. and with it the 
evolution of a conceptually coherent notion of British Citizenship.
However, behind the accidents of history, there also lurk very serious 
philosophical and normative considerations upon the nature of individual 
liberty and sovereign power: normative reflections which were to find their 
way into British constitutional thinking and so crystallise and preserve the 
very strange ‘deep’ concept of the relationship between the Briton and the 
British State. Where the French were to be created by the French State. 
Lord Coke’s innate disapproval of the constituting but exclusionary nature 
of the law of men was to linger on into the present, determining that 
autonomous Britons would not only always possess a life outside the 
British State, but would be free to decide for themselves the social 
characteristics which would mark ‘Britishness.’ Equally, where in France, 
legitimate sovereign power was to be established by the incorporation of 
the populace within the state, in the UK political institutions rather the 
people were to be sovereign, dictating that Britons would always remain at 
representative arms length form power. Both the autonomous sphere of 
pre-statal social liberty and the political sphere of sovereign power would 
be guided by their own normative framework. Civility being maintained in 
the private sphere by virtue of a non political rule of law; and the sovereign 
power being controlled, or historically at least, by the prescription that it 
need be wisely exercised in the interests of the nation.
A subtle balancing mechanism, ensuring liberty not through higher 
rights but via a concordance of civil private interchange and self-limiting 
political action, cohesion was maintained not any quasi-spiritual and 
exclusionary notion of national belonging and community; and was only to 
falter as demands for substantive equality amongst Britons was to see a 
sovereign power unconvincingly claim to speak, not in the interests of, but 
for the nation.
As a final aside, however, this inability to sustain sufficient national 
community to ensure true social parity (the greatest weakness both in UK 
state theory and in the relationship maintained between Briton and British 
State) may now be argued possibly to be (again accidentally) on its way to 
solution; and. in perhaps the greatest ironic twist, not via formalised 
collectivisation or incorporation, but via the dissolution of the sovereign 
power of the parliamentary body politic. Though far too recent an event for 
detailed comment here, latter-day UK constitutional reform would thus at 
last appear to be going some w'ay to meeting the English pluralist critique 
that the real problem in Britain is not the lack of a formalised constitution 




























































































power itself. Society is a federation of various groups and individuals: to 
create some common will and community out of this diversity is only to 
mythologise. Worse still, to attach sovereign power to a myth is to dictate. 
Is then, the UK’s Parliament’s simple ‘devolution’ (note no attempt is to be 
made to introduce a coherent federal ‘state’ into the UK) of powers to 
regional assemblies in Scotland and Wales, plus its extraordinary 
willingness to share its supposedly indivisible sovereignty with the Irish 
Republic and a (yet to be formed) N. Irish Council, a sign that the days of 
large-scale and unitary statehood are definitively over. No myths, no 
imposition of mythologically legitimated sovereignty, and instead the 
beginnings of a far more complex plural scheme of fragmented and 
interlocking sovereignties, and (if the word can be said to exist) semi­
sovereignties; with far smaller, self-defining communities being the basis 
for true community, and thus sustainable (though probably on a less 
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